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Abstract 
In this paper, we empirically explore the determinants of bureaucratic capacity in contemporary 
Africa. We connect the aid-governance literature with the historical, political economy and 
anthropological literature on African state formation. Our Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) results 
show that there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between precolonial 
centralization and bureaucratic quality in Africa from the mid-1990s onwards. Before the mid-
1990s there is no such relationship. We also find that the often negative and statistically 
significant effect of aid dependence on bureaucratic capacity disappears, once we control for 
precolonial centralization. The OLS results survive a set of robustness tests, including the 
addition of several control variables and instrumental variable estimation using a variety of 
instruments suggested in previous research. As the colonial period is slowly fading, the influence 
of precolonial political institutions on modern state capacity is reasserting itself. Our results 
provide further evidence for the importance of precolonial centralization in our understanding of 
present day economic and political developments on the continent. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The functioning of the state is one of the core issues in economic development (Weber, 1922). A 
major strand in the political science and economics literature highlights the importance of state 
capacity for raising taxes, protecting property rights, and ultimately for economic growth and 
development (Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2001, 2002; Besley & Persson, 2010; Dincecco 
& Prado, 2012; Evans & Rauch, 1999). Findings from this literature help us understand why 
some regions are more prosperous than others. There is also general agreement that present -day 
low income levels in Africa can be explained in part by dysfunctional state institutions (Acemoglu 
& Robinson, 2010; Bates, 2008; Meredith, 2005). Surprisingly, there has been little theoretical or 
quantitative research on (i) the mechanisms that are conducive to state capacity building and (ii) 
the persistence of weak states (Acemoglu, Ticchi, & Vindigni, 2011; Besley & Persson, 2009, 
2011).  
In this paper, we empirically explore the determinants of bureaucratic capacity in contemporary 
Africa.1 By bureaucratic capacity, we mean a state with an effective bureaucracy. Our point of 
departure is a “Weberian bureaucracy which is structured along impersonal, technocratic, 
hierarchical lines. Its written records provide a strong institutional memory, and its personnel ha s 
formal salaries, relies on standard operating procedures and knowledge-based rules, and answers 
to superiors who (ideally) take decisions according to impersonal, technocratic criteria” 
(Bräutigam, 2008, p. 15). There is broad consensus among scholars that bureaucratic capacity can 
be regarded as one of the most important aspects of state capacity (Cingolani, Thomsson, & De 
Crombrugghe, 2015; Evans & Rauch, 1999; Hendrix, 2010). 
In this study, we focus on the role of foreign aid and precolonial centralization in shaping 
bureaucratic quality. Foreign aid is often suggested as one of the determinants of bureaucratic 
capacity building in Africa. A large number of international financial institutions, aid agencies and 
policy experts have identified public sector capacity building as a core objective and crucial 
element if African governments are to achieve their goals of poverty reduction and socio-
economic development. As Fukuyama (2004) puts it, “the ability to shore up or create from 
whole cloth missing state capabilities and institutions has risen to the top of the global agenda” 
(p. 18). Several empirical studies have investigated the links between foreign aid and (i) economic 
growth, (ii) poverty reduction, (iii) democratization or (iv) good governance, yielding at best 
mixed results (Burnside & Dollar, 1997, 2000; Collier & Dollar, 2002; Djankov, Montalvo, & 
Reynal-Querol, 2008; Easterly, Levine, & Roodman, 2004).  
                                                                 
1 Unless specified otherwise, the term ‘Africa’ refers to the entire continent (i.e. including both North Africa and 
Sub-Saharan Africa). 
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Our study empirically examines the relationship between the degree of dependence on foreign aid 
and state capacity, a fundamentally different concept than the concept of good governance. In our 
attempt to investigate the link between foreign aid and bureaucratic capacity, another variable – 
precolonial political centralization – comes out as important. An emerging empirical literature has 
documented a positive and robust link between precolonial political centralization and (i) 
economic development (Michalopoulos & Papaioannou, 2013, 2014, 2015), (ii) public goods 
provision (Gennaioli & Rainer, 2007; Osafo-Kwaako & Robinson, 2013) and (iii) institutional 
quality in Africa (Gennaioli & Rainer, 2006). 
In our dynamic analysis we start by looking at the proximate determinants of state capacity that 
can explain variations in the change of bureaucratic quality over time. We show that for the period 
1984-2014, high degrees of dependence on international aid appear to undermine bureaucratic 
quality of recipient countries when not controlling for precolonial centralization. Our results are 
similar to previous empirical findings and seem to support the view taken by aid pessimists (e.g. 
Bauer, 1975; Easterly, 2006; Moyo, 2009). However, in our static analysis, we examine the deep 
determinants of the level of bureaucratic quality in 2014, and we find that precolonial 
centralization trumps everything else. On average, a higher level of precolonial centralization is 
associated with a stronger bureaucratic quality in 2014.  
Motivated by this finding of our static analysis, we then extend our dynamic analysis by also 
controlling for precolonial centralization. After controlling for precolonial centralization, the aid 
dependence variable loses most of its explanatory power. At the same time, we find a positive 
and highly statistically significant relationship between precolonial centralization and 
improvements in bureaucratic quality.  
We then subdivide our 30-year period into two sub-periods, 1984-1995 and 1996-2014. The 
results for the two sub-periods differ remarkably. For the early period, we do find a strong 
negative link between aid dependence and bureaucratic quality, even after controlling for 
precolonial centralization. The precolonial centralization variable in turn has little explanatory 
power. In the latter period, the negative effect of foreign aid is statistically significant in some 
specifications when not controlling for precolonial centralization, but when controlling for 
precolonial centralization, the aid dependence variable once again loses most of its explanatory 
power. We consistently find a strong link between precolonial centralization and improvements 
in bureaucratic quality between 1996 and 2014. Our results remain intact after using additional 
controls. 
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We then show that our results remain robust when using an alternative estimation strategy. We 
use a TseTse Suitability Index (TSI) constructed by Alsan (2015) as an instrumental variable for 
precolonial centralization in the static analysis, in order to control for the possibility of omitted 
variable bias. Our econometric analysis shows that endogeneity concerns are to a large extent 
unwarranted and we therefore continue to treat precolonial centralization as exogenous for the 
rest of the empirical analysis. In the dynamic analysis, foreign aid is instrumented by the initial 
development level and population, in order to control for possible reverse causation. Our 
empirical findings provide further evidence for the historical relevance of the legacy of precolonial 
state characteristics for current economic and political developments on the African continent. 
Our study is innovative in two ways. First, we connect the aid-governance literature with the 
historical, political economy and anthropological literature on African state formation. Second, 
we construct an instrument for precolonial centralization at the national level to account for 
potential endogeneity. Moreover, our key empirical findings are also twofold. First, we show that 
there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between precolonial centralization and 
state capacity in Africa from the mid-1990s onwards. Before the mid-1990s there is no such 
relationship. Second, we find that the statistically significant effect of aid on state capacity 
disappears for the full and recent period, once we control for precolonial centralization.  
 
2. RELATED LITERATURE 
In this section we will first briefly discuss the concept of state capacity and its different 
dimensions. Moreover, we will highlight the theoretical and methodological differences between 
the concepts of good governance and state capacity (section 2.1). In sections 2.2 and 2.3, we will 
explore the proximate and deep determinants of modern state capacity, respectively.  
2.1. State capacity in its broader context 
Definitions of good governance are typically captured by desirable attributes of public 
administration such as low levels of corruption, adequate supply of public goods, improvements 
in voice and accountability or equality before the law. Most scholars therefore use the term ‘good 
governance’ to refer to its normative component, namely decision-making practices which are 
considered ethically desirable (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Zoido-Lobatón, 1999). Other scholars use 
the term ‘governance’ to refer to a subset of desirable policies (Rodrik, 2000). Academic scientists 
have so far not been able to clarify what “good governance” actually means at the conceptual 
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level. Unfortunately, lack of objective data and absence of an universal definition for the concept 
of “good governance” inevitably lead to ambiguous results limiting its usefulness.  
While the concept of state capacity is often proxied through common good governance 
indicators such as rule of law, control of corruption, protection of property rights, etc., we argue 
that state capacity is an important and separate dimension of the quality of government . The 
concept of state capacity avoids normative conceptions about what the state ought to do or how 
it ought to do it. The term ‘state capacity’ generally refers to a variety of dimensions of state 
power, such as coercive/military, fiscal, administrative, legal, political  and relational/territorial 
coverage. Hendrix (2010) concludes that (1) survey measures of bureaucratic quality and (2) 
taxation capacity are the most theoretically and empirically justified. 
The fiscal dimension of state capacity emphasizes the ability of the state to collect taxes from its 
citizenry (Levi, 1988; Tilly, 1975). Commonly used proxies for fiscal capacity in both the 
theoretical and empirical political economy literature are (i) the share of direct taxes in total tax 
revenues or (ii) tax revenue as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) (Besley & Persson, 
2008; Dincecco & Prado, 2012; Tammen & Kugler, 2012). Those indicators, however, suffer 
from multiple shortcomings: First, those measures do not only measure the capacity to tax, but 
also the willingness to tax. Normative preferences of the population about the optimal level of 
taxation may vary quite significantly. Second, governments in countries with natural resources 
may find it fairly easy to collect taxes from their citizenry provided that they have enough 
coercive capacity to protect the resources.  
 
We focus on the administrative component of state capacity in our analysis for the following 
reasons. First, bureaucratic quality can be regarded as a precondition for taxation capacity. 
Second, the measure is available over a long period of time.  Third, in contrast to the fiscal 
dimension of state capacity, bureaucratic quality is a conceptually clearer measure of state 
capacity. And fourth, the bureaucratic dimension of state capacity is perhaps the most widely 
used in the political economy literature, probably due to the strong theoretical legacy of Max 
Weber (1922).2  
 
The most commonly used proxy for administrative state capacity is bureaucratic quality, a 
concept deeply rooted in the Weberian view of the modern state and the necessity for a 
professional bureaucracy. A professional bureaucracy outlives rulers and is crucial for the 
                                                                 
2 The theoretical and empirical associations between bureaucratic autonomy and the various measures of state 
capacity that scholars have presented are discussed by Cingolani, Thomsson and De Crombrugghe (2015). 
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impersonal implementation of politics. Moreover, countries with high bureaucratic quality 
possess bureaucracies that tend to be somewhat autonomous from political pressure and tend to 
have developed extensive mechanisms for recruitment and training (Evans & Rauch, 1999; Rauch 
& Evans, 2000). 
2.2. Proximate determinants of state capacity 
The pioneering work on state formation and the historical determinants of state capacity is the 
bellicist hypothesis put forward by Tilly (1975, 1990). One of the central paradoxes in European 
state formation is the fact that “the pursuit of war and military capacity, after having created 
national states as a sort of by-product, led to a civilianization of government and domestic 
politics” (Tilly, 1990, p. 206). A large number of African states, however, gained independence 
without the need to combat. Most of the conflicts in post-colonial Africa were regional, e.g. 
intrastate wars. Since African states have seldom fought wars of conquest, e.g. interstate wars, 
their governments faced little significant external threats. As a result, the pressure to build an 
effective central administration that levies taxes and protects private property was significantly 
lower if compared to the European case (Bates, 2001; Herbst, 1990).3 Herbst postulates that 
“(…) the symbiotic relationship that war fostered in Europe between tax collection and nationalism is 
absent in Africa, precisely because there is no external threat to encourage people to acquiesce in the 
state’s demands, and no challenge that causes them to respond as a nation” (Herbst, 1990, p. 131). 
Another strand of the political economy literature establishes a negative relationship between 
ethnic tensions and institutional capacity (Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, & Kurlat, 2003). In 
several political economy models, large resource wealth is related to higher risk of civil war 
concomitant with weakened state capacity (Besley & Persson, 2011; Fearon & Laitin, 2003). 
Countries with natural resource abundance, particularly large oil wealth, tend to suffer from a 
political ‘Dutch Disease’ (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Wantchekon, 2002). High commodity 
dependence generates little incentives to invest in fiscal capacity as resource rents can easily be 
appropriated by the government elites (Jensen, 2011). In his study, Humphreys (2005) uncovers a 
positive relationship between state weakness and civil war onset at all positive levels of oil 
production. Finally, according to the modernization theory, positive changes in GDP per capita 
are said to positively contribute to institutional capacity (Lipset, 1959). 
                                                                 
3 The commonly held view that external war threat is conducive to state building, while domestic violence is 
detrimental for state capacity is also captured in recent political economy models (Besley & Persson, 2008, 2011). 
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Numerous scholars attribute a part of the disempowerment of central administration and decline 
in state institutional capacity in several African countries to foreign aid (e.g. Ayittey, 2005; Bauer, 
1975; Easterly, 2006; Moyo, 2009). According to those aid pessimists, state institutions in 
recipient countries have lost a significant amount of decision-making power through large aid 
dependence as active policy making was partly or entirely externalized. The nature of the African 
state made it perfectly possible that the neopatrimonial regime could coexist with a Weberian 
rational bureaucracy (van de Walle, 2001). Moreover, van de Walle is convinced that the 
“institutionalization of crisis management over a twenty-year period has disempowered central 
administrations for the benefit of donor experts and ad hoc domestic decision-making structures. 
The decline of state capacity has invigorated patrimonial tendencies throughout the region” (p. 
275). 
Several studies have empirically supported the view of aid pessimists. Among others, studies by 
Djankov, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2008) as well as Rajan and Subramanian (2007) have 
aimed at quantifying the negative effect of development assistance on democratization and 
governance, respectively. The foreign aid literature that empirically explores the causal link 
between aid dependency and state capacity remains surprisingly sparse. Knack (2001) finds a robust 
statistical relationship between high aid levels in Africa and deteriorations in bureaucratic quality. 
Similarly, Bräutigam and Knack (2004) find robust statistical evidence that higher aid levels 
correspond with larger declines in tax revenues as a share of GDP in Sub-Saharan Africa. Knack 
and Rahman (2007) explore how competitive donor practices can erode administrative capacity in 
recipient countries. A recent paper by Selaya and Thiele (2012) studying the impact of foreign aid 
on bureaucratic quality overcomes an important drawback of the existing literature: it focuses on 
disaggregated flows of aid rather than on a single aid aggregate. The authors find that the 
functioning of the bureaucracy is adversely affected by grants, but not by loans.  
A more nuanced view is taken by another group of scholars who are less pessimistic about the 
consequences of foreign aid. We will call them conditional optimists. Their work shows that large 
quantities of development assistance do not systematically affect the quality of policies or 
institutional capacity (Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Rodrik, 1996). Those scholars argue that the return 
of aid is highest in sound institutional environments and lowest in poor institutional 
environments, regardless of whether ‘environment’ is defined in terms of prudent 
macroeconomic policy or a broader set of political and economic institutions (Burnside & Dollar, 
1997, 2000; Dollar & Pritchett, 1998). While Collier and Dollar (2002) admit that aid could 
become detrimental beyond a certain threshold point even in a ‘good’ policy environment, “the 
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point at which aid starts to have negative effects is well above the range pertinent for most of 
Africa” (Collier, 1999, p. 531).4  
The foreign aid literature summarized in this section views institutional quality as a dynamic and 
malleable social construct determined by current events and present-day policies. Those scholars 
regard international financial communities, international policymakers, aid agencies, and NGOs 
as important stakeholders in the attempt to promote state capacity improvement on the African 
continent, for the better or for the worse. In the next section, we will discuss some of the deep 
determinants of contemporary state capacity in Africa. 
2.3. Deep determinants of state capacity 
A major factor which is positively correlated with state formation – characterized, among other 
things, by political centralization, a monopoly of violence, tax monopoly and effective 
bureaucratic institutions – in Europe is population density. According to Bairoch (1988), 
increased urbanization and better transportation networks during the Industrial Revolution in 
Europe significantly promoted state formation and modern state capacity. The high population 
density in Europe made land relatively scarce and therefore very attractive to control (Tilly, 1990). 
In contrast, low population density and land abundance impaired political centralization in major 
parts of Africa as many African governments faced difficulties to penetrate and control major 
parts of their hinterlands (Mamdani, 1996). As low population densities make territorial conflicts 
less likely, governments have fewer incentives and less means to extend their rule beyond the 
capital cities and a few other population centers (Bates, 2001; Herbst, 2000).  
In many developing countries, the legitimacy of modern state institutions remains weak as the 
internal pacification of the territory has not yet been completed, partly because the impetus for 
modern state formation and institutional capacity development in developing countries was 
colonial penetration (Szirmai, 2015; Young, 1994). In fact, one of the most salient features of 
African contemporary state bureaucracy is its inherited colonial legacy. An important strand of 
quantitative and qualitative literature has stressed the long-term effects of colonial intrusion on 
contemporary development, public goods provision and state capacity in Africa (Acemoglu et al., 
2001; Frankema & van Waijenburg, 2014; Huillery, 2009, 2010; Young, 1994) . One of the 
negative consequences of colonization is the arbitrary nature of post-colonial boundaries in the 
process of colonial state formation (Alesina, Easterly, & Matuszeski, 2011; Ayittey, 2005; 
Englebert, 2000). Yet another strand of literature goes further back in time, emphasizing the 
                                                                 
4 Please consult chapter 14 of Szirmai (2015) for a recent survey on the theoretical and empirical literature on foreign 
aid. 
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importance of the slave trade in explaining the weakness of contemporary African states and the 
lack of economic development (Manning, 1990; Nunn & Wantchekon, 2011; Nunn, 2008). 
Other scholars have stressed the importance of environmental and geographic constraints – e.g. 
climate, topography, geology and biogeography – that have conditioned the progress of 
economic and institutional development (Engerman & Sokoloff, 1997; Gallup, Sachs, & 
Mellinger, 1999). Diamond (1997) argues that differences in prehistoric biogeographical 
conditions between Eurasia and Africa have influenced the timing of the transition from hunter-
gatherer societies to settled agriculture, subsistence farming and ultimately state formation.  
A growing body of research, however, highlights the importance of precolonial ethnic institutions 
for contemporary public goods provision and economic development in Africa. On average, 
better provision of basic public goods (education, health, and infrastructure) is found in African 
regions with more centralised precolonial institutions (Gennaioli & Rainer, 2007; Osafo-Kwaako 
& Robinson, 2013). Moreover, Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013, 2014) attribute a higher 
regional development in the historical homelands of ethnicities to centralized, hierarchical, 
precolonial political institutions. Precolonial centralization is a robust correlate of regional 
development outside Africa as well: Studying the historical formation of Native American 
reservations, Dippel (2014) uncovers a negative link between forced integration of autonomous 
polities into a system of shared governance and long-run economic development. Gennaioli and 
Rainer (2006) assess whether early statehood in Africa is associated with a higher quality of 
government at the national level. Their results suggest that African countries with higher 
precolonial centralization show lower levels of corruption and a higher rule of law today.  
The research by the aforementioned group of scholars is based on qualitative evidence by the (i) 
historical, political science literature and the (ii) anthropology literature on African state 
formation. The authors of the former group emphasize the continuity of precolonial institutions 
in African history (Boone, 2003; Mamdani, 1996). In the latter group, scholars distinguish 
between two political systems in Africa: Some ethnic groups possessed highly centralized systems 
characterized by centralized authority, administrative machinery, and judicial institutions while 
other ethnic groups lived in less centralized systems characterized by cleavages of wealth and no 
sharp divisions of rank, status, or wealth (Fortes & Evans-Pritchard, 1940, p. 5).5 
Building on the literature reviewed in this section, we connect the aid-governance literature with 
the historical, political economy and anthropological literature on African state formation.  Our 
                                                                 
5 The distinct precolonial political systems have emerged from unique socio-economic and political trajectories of the 
respective ethnic groups. Consequently, the varying precolonial political systems should be regarded as “optimal” 
solutions to the respective problems faced by those particular societies. 
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work therefore focuses on one of the proximate and one of the deep determinants of modern 
state capacity in Africa, namely foreign aid and precolonial political centralization. 
 
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
We pursue two lines of analysis, one static and one dynamic. For the static analysis, our 
dependent variable is the level of bureaucratic quality in 2014. For the dynamic analysis, we will 
use the changes in bureaucratic quality over time as our dependent variable. The bureaucratic 
quality index used in this analysis comes from the PRS Group’s International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG). It measures the institutional strength and the extent to which the bureaucracy tends to 
minimize policy shifts when governments change. The index is an expert survey measure and 
must therefore be regarded as a subjective indicator. It reflects perceptions of changes in 
bureaucratic quality, not actual changes. According to Hendrix (2010), this index “most closely 
captures the important components of the theoretical construct of bureaucratic/administrative 
capacity: professionalism, insulation from political pressure, and efficacy in delivering 
government services” (p. 278). The index ranges from zero to four and covers 37 African 
countries for the time period 1984-2014.6 Countries with high bureaucratic quality are somewhat 
autonomous from political pressure and tend to have developed mechanisms for recruitment and 
training (Evans & Rauch, 1999; Rauch & Evans, 2000). We regard the index as the probably most 
satisfactory measure of bureaucratic quality. 
Table 1 shows variations in bureaucratic quality across nations and over time. In terms of average 
bureaucratic quality over the period 1984-2014, countries like South Africa, Kenya, Namibia, 
Botswana and Ghana are among the high performing countries. In contrast, countries like Sierra 
Leone, Togo, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Somalia, Liberia and Mali are among the 
low performing countries. In terms of change, Botswana and Ghana are also among those 
countries that have witnessed major improvements of bureaucratic quality over time, while other 
countries like South Africa or Côte d’Ivoire have witnessed major deteriorations in their 
administrative capacity. How to explain those differences in performance over time is a major 
question to be addressed in this paper. 
 
 
                                                                 
6 The first observation for the countries of Botswana, Burkina Faso, Madagascar, Sierra Leone and Somalia is 1985. 
The coverage for Gambia and Guinea-Bissau starts in 1986. For those countries, we will assume that the starting 
value in 1984 equals the value in 1985 or 1986, respectively. Data for Namibia is available from 1990 onwards.  
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Table 1: Bureaucratic Quality in Africa – across countries and over time 
Country 
Average  
Bureaucratic Quality,  
1984-2014 
Country 
Change in 
Bureaucratic Quality,  
1984-2014 
 
High performing countries 
 
South Africa 2.83 Ghana 2.50 
Kenya 2.39 Botswana† 2.00 
Namibia* 2.36 Gambia‡ 2.00 
Botswana† 2.24 Guinea 2.00 
Ghana 2.18 Namibia* 2.00 
Zimbabwe 2.14 Uganda 2.00 
Gabon 2.13 Ethiopia† 1.50 
Morocco 2.09 Guinea-Bissau‡ 1.50 
Tunisia 2.00 Malawi 1.50 
Egypt 1.97 Niger† 1.50 
Low performing countries 
Zambia 0.98   
Ethiopia† 0.78 Gabon -0.17 
Tanzania 0.75 Morocco -0.42 
Sudan 0.74 Angola -0.50 
Sierra Leone† 0.48 Zimbabwe -0.83 
Togo 0.44 Cameroon -0.92 
DRC 0.38 Senegal -1.00 
Somalia† 0.16 Togo -1.00 
Liberia 0.00 South Africa -2.00 
Mali 0.00 Cote d'Ivoire -3.00 
Note: † refers to period 1985-2014; ‡ refers to period 1986-2014; * refers to period 1990-2014. 
Source: Own calculations based on data from the PRS Group’s International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
 
Our main explanatory variables for the analysis are (i) foreign aid dependence and (ii) precolonial 
centralization. Our measure for aid dependence is constructed in the following way: we take 
annual total DAC-ODA disbursements in current dollars from the OECD/DAC database and 
divide them by the GDP (in current dollars) of the respective recipient country. GDP data comes 
from Maddison (2010) and the World Development Indicators published by the World Bank. 
Several previous studies within the foreign aid literature have used the same or similar variables 
(Bräutigam & Knack, 2004; Djankov et al., 2008). Table 2 presents the largest and smallest aid 
recipients in Africa over the time period 1984-2014. Somalia, Liberia, Mozambique, Sao Tomé 
and Principe, Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde received the largest amounts of ODA as a 
percentage of GDP. Libya, Tunisia, South Africa, Algeria, Nigeria and Mauritius have received 
the least amounts of ODA as a percentage of GDP. 
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Table 2: Ranking of the largest and smallest aid recipients in Africa, 1984-2014 
Country  Average 
ODA/GDP (%) 
Country Average 
ODA/GDP (%) 
Somalia 24.02 Libya 0.07 
Liberia 21.70 Tunisia 0.10 
Mozambique 19.44 South Africa 0.17 
Sao Tomé and Principe 19.40 Algeria 0.25 
Guinea-Bissau 18.69 Nigeria 0.73 
Cape Verde 16.76 Mauritius 0.94 
Source: Own calculations based on OECD DAC Statistics and World Development Indicators 
Our proxy for the degree of precolonial centralization comes from Gennaioli and Rainer (2007). 
The authors developed a centralization index at the national level for 48 countries in Africa. The 
index aims to capture the degree of political complexity on the continent in precolonial times. 
Their data comes from Murdock (1967) and from the Atlas Narodov Mira, a Soviet ethnographic 
source (Bruk & Apenchenko, 1964).7 Murdock (1967) published an Ethnographic Atlas that 
coded around 60 variables, capturing cultural, geographical, and economic characteristics of 1270 
ethnicities around the world. The information is derived from a variety of individual field-studies 
done by anthropologists between 1850 and 1950. It is worth noting that the information for 
every ethnic group is pinpointed to the earliest period for which satisfactory data existed in order 
to avoid the acculturative effects of contacts with Europeans (Gennaioli & Rainer, 2006, 2007). 
Gennaioli and Rainer measure precolonial political institutions using Murdock’s “Jurisdictional 
Hierarchy Beyond the Local Community Level” index. The index is an ordered variable, ranging 
from 0 to 4. It describes the number of political jurisdictions above the local level for each 
ethnicity.8 A zero score indicates stateless societies “lacking any form of centralized political 
organization.” A score of 1 designates petty chiefdoms; a score of 2 is associated with paramount 
chiefdoms; and a score of 3 or 4 refers to ethnic groups that were part of large states. The 
classification resembles that of Diamond (1997), who distinguished between four different social 
structures: bands, tribes, chiefdoms, and centralized states. 
An ethnic group is defined as “centralized” if it has 2, 3, or 4 jurisdictional levels above the local 
community. An ethnic group is defined as “fragmented” if it has “only” 0 or 1 jurisdictional 
levels above the local community. While highly centralized ethnic groups “have developed a form 
of government with large, territorially integrated political entities, (…) fragmented ethnic groups 
have been traditionally organized in a multitude of small and fragmented, political entities, often 
lacking any political integration above the local village” (Gennaioli & Rainer, 2007, p. 188). Prime 
                                                                 
7 In their study, Gennaioli and Rainer (2007) focus on Sub-Saharan Africa excluding South Africa which reduces 
their sample to 42 countries. 
8 The local level usually refers to the village level. 
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examples of highly centralized groups are the Kaffa (Ethiopia), the Luba (DRC) or the Yoruba 
(Nigeria).9 Gennaioli and Rainer (2006, 2007) then matched 300 African ethnic groups to ethnic 
groups listed in the Atlas Narodov Mira, which gives the most detailed division of the world 
population into different ethnic groups. Using the ethnic composition of every African country 
from the Atlas Narodov Mira, the authors then calculated the share of each country's non-
European population belonging to centralized ethnic groups. For each country, the index 
measures the share of the non-European population that belongs to indigenously “centralized” 
ethnic groups. The scale ranges between 0 and 1, whereby a higher value corresponds to a more 
“centralized” national state.10 Table 3 summarizes the level of precolonial centralization for those 
African countries where data is available. 
Table 3: Precolonial political centralization in Africa 
Country Centralization Country Centralization 
Comoros 1 Angola 0.635 
Lesotho 1 Uganda 0.634 
Swaziland 1 Togo 0.622 
Burundi 0.995 Niger 0.582 
Algeria 0.990 Sudan 0.576 
Egypt 0.990 Congo Republic 0.536 
South Africa 0.990 Madagascar 0.505 
Rwanda 0.982 Nigeria 0.478 
Tunisia 0.980 Gambia 0.426 
Zimbabwe 0.965 Guinea 0.406 
Libya 0.940 Chad 0.384 
Botswana 0.893 Burkina Faso 0.338 
Malawi 0.861 Cameroon 0.316 
Mauritania 0.858 Guinea-Bissau 0.214 
Mozambique 0.844 Equatorial Guinea 0.211 
Ethiopia 0.843 Kenya 0.172 
Morocco 0.810 Central African Republic 0.144 
Zambia 0.743 Djibouti 0.133 
Benin 0.695 Mali 0.115 
Senegal 0.694 Cote d’Ivoire 0.082 
Tanzania 0.669 Somalia 0.034 
Namibia 0.664 Gabon 0.011 
Ghana 0.651 Sierra Leone 0.008 
DRC 0.649 Liberia 0 
  AVERAGE (non-weighted) 0.587 
Note: The precolonial political centralization index measures the share of the Non-European population that had 
centralized political institutions before colonization. 
Source: Gennaioli and Rainer (2007) 
                                                                 
9 The ancient kingdom of Kaffa (c.1390–1897) was an early modern state located in what is now Ethiopia. The Luba 
Empire (c. 1585–1885) was once an influential Central African state in what is now the Katanga Province of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Oyo Empire (c. 1400–1895) was a Yoruba empire of what is today western 
and northern Nigeria. It became one of the largest West African states in precolonial times.  
10 In order to focus on the role of indigenous African institutions, Gennaioli and Rainer (2006, 2007) excluded 
Europeans. The results, however, remain unchanged if Europeans are also included in the centralization index. 
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Lesotho, for example, is a highly centralized country as both of its ethnic groups – the Sotho and 
the Zulu – are highly centralized groups. Liberia instead is a highly fragmented country as both of 
its ethnic groups – the Kru and the Peripheral Mende – are highly fragmented. Most countries, 
however, are home to both centralized and fragmented groups. A recent study that cross-
validated Murdock’s data by crucially examining the African historiography suggests that “the 
jurisdictional hierarchy index – while not perfect – is in accordance with works describing the 
degree of political complexity in precolonial Africa” (Michalopoulos & Papaioannou, 2013, p. 
119). 
Dynamic analysis 
In our dynamic analysis, we will empirically investigate the relationship between foreign aid 
dependence and the evolution of bureaucratic capacity in Africa. Our dynamic analysis covers the 
years 1984-2014.  
Our basic regression specification for the dynamic analysis is: 
∆𝐵𝑄𝑖,1984 −2014 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1 ∗ 𝐵𝑄𝑖,1984 +  𝛽2 ∗  𝐴𝑖𝑑 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖,1984 −2013 +  𝜀𝑖   (1) 
where ∆𝐵𝑄𝑖,84−14 is the change in bureaucratic quality in country i over the time period 1984-
2014, 𝐵𝑄𝑖,84  is the level of initial bureaucratic quality in country i, 𝐴𝑖𝑑 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖,84−13  is the 
average level of DAC-ODA aid as a percentage of GDP over the time period 1984-2013. 
Parameter 𝛽2 captures the relationship between aid dependence and the change in bureaucratic 
quality. 
This specification limits the extent of problems related to omitted variable bias. By regressing the 
change of bureaucratic quality over time on its initial level, we capture regression-to-the-mean 
effects and control for the opportunity of initially high- and low-performing countries to decrease 
and increase their scores, respectively. Moreover, controlling for the initial level of bureaucratic 
quality helps us to control for a large set of historically slow moving factors explaining 
differences in the level of bureaucratic quality across countries, such as ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization, geographic factors, or unobservable characteristics like culture.  
We extend Equation (1) by including a vector of time-varying covariates of bureaucratic quality, 
𝑋𝑖,84−13, in order to control for potential confounding factors: 
∆𝐵𝑄𝑖,84−14 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1 ∗ 𝐵𝑄𝑖 ,84 +  𝛽2 ∗ 𝐴𝑖𝑑 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖,84−13 + 𝛽′3 ∗ 𝑋𝑖,84−13 +  𝜀𝑖    (2) 
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One important control variable is the extent of both domestic and external political violence in 
the host country. Domestic (and external) violence usually attracts a significant amount of 
development assistance – particularly humanitarian and post-conflict assistance. Failing to 
account for political violence can therefore produce a spurious correlation between aid levels and 
weakened state capacity. Data on both domestic and external political violence come from the 
Center for Systemic Peace (Marshall, 2014) and from the International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG) by the PRS Group.12  
We will also control for ethnic tensions. The data also comes from the ICRG. The index of 
ethnic tensions assesses the degree of tensions within a country attributable to racial, nationality 
or language divisions. One major advantage of the index from the PRS Group over several other 
popular ethnic fractionalization and polarization indices is the fact that it is time-variant.13 14 
Our  proxy for oil wealth is an oil production dummy constructed by the authors. The variable 
measures the proportion of years, for each country, in which oil has been produced. For the time 
period 1984-2013, the oil-rich countries Angola and Sudan, for example, are coded as one, while 
non-oil countries such as Botswana or Ethiopia are coded as zero. Calculations are based on data 
from the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) Agency and Ross (2013). 
Since the ICRG ratings on bureaucratic quality are subjective indicators, economic performance 
may influence the ratings even in the absence of a causal relation. If recipient countries witness 
economic growth (decline) concomitant with improving (worsening) state capacity and declining 
(rising) levels of development aid, controlling for changes in the development level is crucial to 
avoid a spurious correlation between aid dependence and bureaucratic quality. GDP per capita 
data is retrieved from Maddison (2010) and the World Bank Development Indicators.15 A full 
description of the variables being used in the analysis is given in Appendix 1. Summary statistics 
for the static and dynamic analysis can be found in Appendix 2 (Table A2.1 and Table A2.2).16 
After having explored the proximate determinants of modern state capacity, we will investigate its 
deep determinants. 
                                                                 
12 Data on political violence from the PRS Group’s International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) is only available from 
1984, however, and thus only used for robustness checks.  
13 Seminal contributions on ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization  using time-invariant indices include 
Alesina et al. (2003), Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín and Wacziarg (2012), Easterly and Levine (1997) as well as Montalvo 
and Reynal-Querol (2005). 
14 In the empirical anaylsis, we are using the average values of the domestic violence, external violence and ethnic 
tension indeces for each country over the time period 1984-2013. 
15 We are not using data from the Penn World Tables (PWT 8.0) because data is missing for six African countries. 
Out of those six countries, three countries are part of our analysis (Algeria, Libya and Somalia). Using PWT data 
would force us to give up on three observations in our already fairly small sample.   
16 This paper distinguishes between main tables and appendix tables. Main tables appear in the text while the annex 
tables can be found in the annex. Annex tables (but also figures) are coded A1, A2, A3, etc. 
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Static analysis 
In our static analysis, we will explore to what extent contemporary African  bureaucratic capacity 
in the year 2014 can be explained by deep historical factors.  For our cross section, we use the 
level of bureaucratic quality in 2014 as our dependent variable.  Our main variable of interest is 
the country-level measure of precolonial centralization. Our basic regression specification for the 
static analysis is: 
𝐵𝑄𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖  + 𝜀𝑖   (3) 
Parameter 𝛽1 captures the relationship between precolonial centralization and the level of 
bureaucratic quality in 2014.  
We extend Equation (3) by including a vector of covariates of bureaucratic quality, in order to 
control for potential confounding factors: 
𝐵𝑄𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽′2 ∗ 𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖        (4) 
This vector of covariates includes, among others, our proximate determinants from the dynamic 
analysis, most notably the average foreign aid dependence over time.17 Besides foreign aid 
dependence, we also include the average values of domestic and external violence as well as oil 
production.18 Another set of control variables includes geographic factors, namely latitude, 
logarithm of the percentage of mountainous terrain in the country, percent of cultivated land and 
mean distance to the nearest coastline or sea-navigable river. The data comes from Gallup, Sachs 
and Mellinger (1999) as well as Fearon and Laitin (2003).  
We also control for prosperity in (i) the medieval ages and (ii) the post-colonial era. Our proxy 
for the former is population density in 1400 and is measured as total population divided by land 
area in millions of square kilometers.19 Statistics on population density come from Parker (1997). 
Our proxy for the latter is the level of economic development in the entire post-independence 
period. It is captured by our control variable average GDP per capita between 1961 and 2013. 
The data comes from Maddison (2010) and the World Development Indicators.  
                                                                 
17 We take the average aid dependence for each country between 1961 and 2013 for those African countries that 
became independent in 1960 or before. For those countries that became independent after 1960, we take the average 
value of aid dependence between the year after the country’s year of independence and 2013. 
18 Those variables are constructed in the same way as the foreign aid dependence variable (see Footnote 17). 
19 Based on previous work by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002) as well as Ashraf and Galor (2011, 2013), we 
believe that using population density as proxy for gauging comparative economic development during the Middle 
Ages is sensible because technolgical advancement in the medieval period “brought about only transitory gains in per 
capita income, eventually leading to a larger but not richer population” (Ashraf & Galor, 2013, p. 5). 
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Moreover, we will account for the colonial legacy by using colonial origin dummies. Ethiopia and 
Liberia are the only two countries we classify as independent.20 The former German colonies – 
Burundi, Cameroon, Rwanda, Tanzania and Togo – were taken over by new colonial rulers after 
the First World War. Consequently, we will divide them among the countries that took them over 
after 1918.21 Morocco is considered as a former French colony, even though it was a joint 
protectorate of France and Spain. Moreover, we have classified Somalia as a UK colony, even if 
there were also (bigger) Italian and (smaller) French portions.22 
An additional control variable in our main analysis is legal origin as there appears to be a strong 
correlation between legal rules, legal origin, economic outcomes and institutional quality (La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1999). The authors emphasize structural differences 
in the British common law or the French, German, or Scandinavian civil law. Their research 
findings suggest that the use of a more interventionist legal system, such as French civil law, is 
associated with inferior government performance. Legal systems in Africa either belong to the 
English common law or the French civil law family. The data comes from the same authors. 
Our proxy for artificial state characteristics comes from Alesina et al. (2011). The authors develop 
two measures, (i) the fractal dimension and (ii) the partitioned dimension of state borders. Those 
measures proxy the degree to which borders are natural or artificial. The fractal variable captures 
the straightness or squiggliness of country borders. The rationale behind the construction of the 
fractal measure is based on the assumption that borders drawn with straight lines increase the 
chances that those borders were drawn artificially, while squiggly lines are less likely to be 
artificial. The partitioned variable is defined as “the percentage of a country’s population that 
belongs to a partitioned group. The latter is a group that is present in two bordering countries” 
(Alesina et al., 2011, p. 260). Since the partitioned dimension turns out to be considerably more 
robust in their analysis, we will use the partitioned measure as our proxy for the level of artificial 
state characteristics in our main analysis.23 
There are, of course, several other potential confounding factors used in the literature, such as 
slave trade (Manning, 1990; Nunn & Wantchekon, 2011; Nunn, 2008), the depth of experience 
                                                                 
20 The Italian Invasion of Abyssinia in 1935–36 resulted in Ethiopia’s subjection to Italian rule. While Ethiopia was 
liberated in 1941, it still included Eritrea until 1988 which was an Italian colony between 1890 and 1950. While 
Liberia was initially colonized by former African American slaves and their free black descendants, the country 
proclaimed its independence from North America in 1847 and has been a sovereign country ever since.  
21 Burundi and Rwanda became Belgian colonies, while Tanzania was under British rule after WWI. Cameroon and 
Togo were subject to a joint French and British mandate. We list Togo under French rule, because the country 
consists of the French portion only while the British part has been annexed to Ghana. We place Cameroon under 
France since it is currently a member of the CFA-franc zone. Our approach is very similar to the approach taken by 
Bertocchi and Canova (2002). 
22 Our empirical results largely remain intact when we classify Somalia as an Italian colony. 
23 Our empirical results do not change when we replace the partitioned variable with the f ractal measure. 
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with state-level institutions (Bockstette, Chanda, & Putterman, 2002; Putterman, 2007), vertical 
legitimacy (Englebert, 2000), constraints on the executive (Marshall, Jaggers, & Gurr, 2014), 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization and polarization (Easterly & Levine, 1997; Montalvo & Reynal-
Querol, 2005), cultural heritage proxied by differences in religion (La Porta et al., 1999; Landes, 
1998), gross public revenue per capita extracted from the citizenry during the colonial period 
(Frankema & van Waijenburg, 2014) or the amount of European settlements during colonial and 
modern times (Acemoglu et al., 2001; McEvedy & Jones, 1975). Those variables, however, will 
not be discussed in great-depth in this paper due to limited space. We have performed additional 
regression estimations controlling for those variables but the results do not change in any 
fundamental way. The additional empirical results not reported in the main text can be found in 
Appendix 3. 
 
4. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
In this section we report our main results. In section 4.1, we present our empirical findings for 
the dynamic analysis. Our results from the static analysis will be discussed in section 4.2. We will 
then return to the dynamic analysis in section 4.3.  
4.1. Effects of Aid Dependence on Changes in Bureaucratic Capacity 
To examine the relationship between development assistance and state capacity between 1984 
and 2014, we regress the change of bureaucratic quality over that 30 year period on foreign aid 
dependence (Table 4). 
In our base specification (column 1), the baseline estimate of -5.55 can be interpreted as follows: 
a country A that is on average ten percent more aid dependent than its counterpart over the 
entire period is expected to witness a deterioration in its bureaucratic quality by 0.56 points , 
ceteris paribus. This effect is quite substantial. By merely controlling for initial bureaucratic 
quality and foreign aid dependence, 70 percent of the variation in the change of bureaucratic 
quality is explained by our model. We add several control variables to our regressions. In column 
(2), we control for the percentage change in GDP per capita over the period 1984-2013. While 
the coefficient of GDP per capita is significant at the 10 percent level, the effect of foreign aid 
dependence on bureaucratic quality remains virtually unchanged. We control for ethnic tensions, 
domestic and external violence, as well as oil wealth in columns (3), (4) and (5). The coefficients 
of the control variables have their expected sign. Moreover, the coefficients are generally 
statistically significant at the five percent level. The exception is the oil production variable. Its 
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coefficient, while having the expected sign, is not statistically significant. Moreover, we find a 
strong regression-to-the-mean effect. Holding all other things constant, country A with an initial 
bureaucratic quality score 1 unit higher than country B is expected to experience a decline in the 
index of between 1 and 1.08 units, relative to country B.  
Table 4: Aid Dependence and Change in Bureaucratic Quality, 1984-2014, OLS estimates 
Dependent Variable: 
∆ Bureaucratic Quality, 1984-2014 
OLS 
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
OLS 
(3) 
OLS 
(4) 
OLS 
(5) 
      
Initial Bureaucratic Quality -1.01*** -1.00*** -1.06*** -1.08*** -1.00*** 
 (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.10) 
      
Mean Aid Dependence, 1984-2013 -5.55*** -5.11*** -4.95*** -4.65*** -6.91*** 
  (1.63) (1.53) (1.38) (1.49) (1.82) 
      
∆ Relative GDP per capita, 1984-2013  0.30* 0.15 0.29* 0.29* 
  (0.16) (0.15) (0.16) (0.15) 
      
Mean Ethnic Tensions, 1984-2013   -0.27**   
    (0.11)   
      
Mean Domestic Violence, 1984-2013    -0.15**  
    (0.07)  
      
Mean External Violence, 1984-2013    0.17**  
     (0.08)  
      
Oil Production Dummy, 1984-2013     -0.38 
     (0.30) 
      
Constant 1.69*** 1.52*** 2.41*** 1.72*** 1.80*** 
 (0.24) (0.24) (0.42) (0.25) (0.33) 
Observations 36 36 36 36 36 
R2 0.70 0.73 0.76 0.76 0.74 
adj. R2 0.68 0.70 0.73 0.71 0.70 
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, 
*at the 10% level. 
 
 
Overall, the coefficient on foreign dependence is always negative and highly statistically 
significant, suggesting that high degrees of dependence on international aid undermine the 
bureaucratic capacity of recipient countries. Our results are similar to the empirical findings 
presented by Bräutigam and Knack (2004). Moreover, those findings support the arguments by 
aid pessimists in general who argue that much of the foreign aid is wasted and contributes very 
little to developmental ends (Bauer, 1975; Easterly, 2006; Moyo, 2009). 
We then subdivide the 30 year period into two sub-periods, namely 1984-1995 and 1996-2014. 
The reason why we split the time period into two is the following: The ending of the Cold War 
heralded the start of a new development paradigm among policymakers and international donor 
communities. From the mid-1990s onwards, greater attention was given to state capacity building 
in recipient countries emphasizing the important role of the state in development (Burnside & 
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Dollar, 2000; Dollar & Pritchett, 1998; World Bank, 1997). Up to the mid-1990s, the motivation 
for aid flows from donor to recipient countries had mainly been strategic and political: “an 
inefficient, economically closed, mismanaged non-democratic former colony politically friendly to 
its former colonizer, receives more foreign aid than another country with similar levels of 
poverty, a superior policy stance, but without a past as a colony” (Alesina & Dollar, 2000, p. 33). 
The collapse of communism and the end of the East-West divide triggered debates and 
discussions among policymakers and donor agencies about the role of development aid in 
reducing poverty, stimulating economic growth but also its potential role in promoting 
democratization in recipient countries. Van de Walle (2001) points out that “by the mid-1990s, 
aid was facing its most severe crisis, and the pressures for change were greater than ever before. 
Aid agencies were beginning to experiment with new approaches” (p. 233). 
Table 5 reports the results for both sub-periods. Looking at the early period first, we observe that 
the coefficient for foreign aid dependence is always negative and highly statistically significant. 
Those results lend support to the view of the aid pessimists. The result remains unchanged after 
adding the same controls as in our previous analysis. We once again find a strong regression-to-
the-mean effect. If we move to the period 1996-2014, we observe that the foreign aid 
dependence variable loses part of its explanatory power even though the coefficient remains 
negative in all cases.  
Burnside and Dollar (2000) have argued for a policy-conditional effect of aid on growth, namely 
that the returns to aid are bigger in recipient countries with better institutions. The positive 
effects of the Marshall aid program after the Second World War, for example, are partly 
attributed to the well-functioning institutions in the Western European recipient countries 
(Behrman, 2007). We extend the Burnside-Dollar hypothesis by applying it to bureaucratic 
capacity rather than economic growth. In our modified Burnside-Dollar hypothesis, we test the 
hypothesis that foreign aid can improve bureaucratic capacity in a recipient country if the initial 
level of bureaucratic quality is higher. We therefore interact mean aid dependence with the initial 
bureaucratic quality level. We find some weak evidence for the modified Burnside-Dollar 
hypothesis, but only for the second sub-period (Table 6). Countries with better initial 
bureaucratic policies have less negative returns to aid due to the mitigating effect coming from 
having a high initial level of institutional capacity.  The results for the full period and the early 
period can be found in Appendix 3. We will return to the modified Burnside-Dollar hypothesis in 
section 4.3. 
Table 5: Aid Dependence and Change in Bureaucratic Quality, 1984-1995 and 1996-2014, OLS estimates 
 Time period 1984-1995  Time period 1996-2014 
Dependent Variable: 
∆ Bureaucratic Quality 
OLS 
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
OLS 
(3) 
OLS 
(4) 
OLS 
(5) 
 OLS 
(6) 
OLS 
(7) 
OLS 
(8) 
OLS 
(9) 
OLS 
(10) 
            
Initial Bureaucratic Quality -0.60*** -0.64*** -0.63*** -0.64*** -0.65***  -0.75*** -0.77*** -0.80*** -0.81*** -0.74*** 
 (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)  (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.17) (0.14) 
            
Mean Aid Dependence -4.33*** -4.48*** -4.48*** -4.43*** -3.27**  -3.63** -4.63 -3.88 -4.39 -7.31** 
  (1.30) (1.11) (1.13) (1.18) (1.43)  (1.71) (2.94) (2.63) (2.78) (3.41) 
            
∆ Relative GDP per capita  0.81 0.82 0.77 0.95**   0.10 0.04 0.06 0.18 
   (0.49) (0.60) (0.51) (0.46)   (0.16) (0.13) (0.14) (0.15) 
            
Mean Ethnic Tensions   0.01      -0.24**   
    (0.14)      (0.09)   
            
Mean Domestic Violence    -0.05      -0.15**  
    (0.05)      (0.06)  
            
Mean External Violence    1.21      0.69  
    (1.21)      (0.52)  
            
Oil Production Dummy     0.42      -0.48* 
     (0.32)      (0.24) 
            
Constant 1.37*** 1.48*** 1.45*** 1.53*** 1.26***  1.12*** 1.15*** 1.82*** 1.32*** 1.43*** 
 (0.24) (0.24) (0.52) (0.27) (0.32)  (0.32) (0.32) (0.47) (0.41) (0.42) 
Observations 36 36 36 36 36  37 37 37 37 37 
R2 0.46 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.53  0.50 0.50 0.58 0.57 0.54 
adj. R2 0.43 0.46 0.44 0.43 0.47  0.47 0.46 0.52 0.50 0.49 
Notes:  Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, *at the 10% level. 
 
 
Table 6: Aid Dependence, Precolonial Centralization and Change in Bureaucratic Quality 
controlling for initial conditions, 1996-2014, OLS estimates 
Dependent Variable: OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
∆ Bureaucratic Quality, 1996-2014 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Initial Bureaucratic Quality -0.85*** -0.94*** -0.96*** -0.93*** -0.89*** 
 (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.19) (0.14) 
      
Mean Aid Dependence, 1996-2013 -5.33*** -8.70*** -7.54** -7.30** -10.30*** 
 (1.85) (3.09) (2.97) (3.49) (3.45) 
      
Mean Aid Dependence, 1996-2013 2.58 4.07* 3.62 2.82 3.36* 
 x Initial Bureaucratic Quality (1.72) (2.08) (2.30) (2.09) (1.97) 
      
∆ Relative GDP per capita, 1996-2013  0.24 0.17 0.16 0.28* 
  (0.16) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) 
      
Mean Ethnic Tensions, 1996-2013   -0.23**   
    (0.09)   
      
Mean Domestic Violence, 1996-2013    -0.13**  
    (0.06)  
      
Mean External Violence, 1996-2013    0.52  
     (0.53)  
      
Oil Production Dummy, 1996-2013     -0.42* 
     (0.24) 
      
Constant 1.22*** 1.36*** 1.97*** 1.46*** 1.56*** 
 (0.33) (0.33) (0.46) (0.42) (0.41) 
Observations 37 37 37 37 37 
R2 0.51 0.54 0.60 0.58 0.57 
adj. R2 0.47 0.48 0.54 0.50 0.50 
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 
5% level, *at the 10% level. 
 
All in all, we find empirical support for both the aid pessimists and conditional optimists. On the 
one hand, large aid dependence undermines institutional capacity development. On the other 
hand, however, this effect is slightly offset by the positive effect of aid on bureaucratic quality in 
recipient countries with a sound institutional environment. Our results are therefore similar to 
previous findings in the aid-governance literature. Moreover, our analysis has reconciled the 
empirical findings by both aid pessimists and conditional optimists. In section 4.2, we will 
investigate the deep sources of contemporary state capacity on the African continent.  
4.2. Deep Determinants of Differences in Contemporary Bureaucratic Capacity Levels 
In Table 7 we report our OLS estimates for the deep determinants of contemporary state 
capacity in Africa. In our basic specification, column (1), precolonial centralization has an 
estimated positive impact on bureaucratic quality in 2014. The estimated coefficient on 
precolonial centralization implies, that a one standard deviation increase (s.d. = 0.77) in 
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precolonial centralization translates, on average, into an expected change in bureaucratic quality 
by 1.01 points. This impact is rather large considering that the bureaucratic quality index ranges 
from 0 to 4 only. This result is intriguing for yet another reason. The R2 equals 0.29, implying that 
almost one-third of the variation in bureaucratic quality in 2014 can be explained by precolonial 
statehood, a phenomenon that dates back to the mid-late 19th century.   
In the remaining odd-numbered columns, we control for other potential confounding factors. 
Even-numbered columns include a rich set of geographic factors. In column (3), we add the 
colonizer identity to the regressions. The non-colonized countries Ethiopia and Liberia serve as 
baseline group. The dummy for being a Belgian colony, which captures the DRC, is highly 
statistically significant and negative. With King Leopold II creating the Congo Free State in 1885 
and colonizing the area as his private holding, the DRC serves as primary example of the 
extractive state (Hochschild, 1998; van Reybrouck, 2010). Moreover, our results in column (3) 
contrast with a common perception that the former British colonies significantly perform better 
if compared to former French colonies (La Porta et al., 1999). Our coefficient for precolonial 
centralization, however, is barely affected.24 In column (5) we add several proximate sources of 
bureaucratic capacity such as foreign aid dependence. Even though all control variables have their 
expected sign, the coefficients are not statistically significant. In column (7), we control for 
British legal origin where French legal origin serves as baseline category. As the coefficient is not 
statistically significantly different from zero, we do not find empirical evidence that African 
countries with a civil law system have lower state capacity levels than do countries with a 
common law system. In column (9) and column (11), we control for initial population density in 
1400 and artificial state characteristics proxied by our partitioned measure, respectively. Both 
coefficients are not statistically significant at all conventional significance levels and of little 
practical importance. More importantly, the addition of those control variables does not 
drastically change the estimated effect of precolonial centralization. 
The results change very little even after controlling for geographic factors (columns 2, 4, 6, 8, 10 
and 12). We conduct an F-test on all geographic controls to see if the coefficients on our 
geographic factors are jointly significant. In all regression estimations, the F-statistic is very low. 
We therefore fail to reject the null hypothesis of no significant effect of our geographic variables. 
At the same time, the coefficient for precolonial centralization even increases several times after 
controlling for geography. Overall, the results presented in Table 7 show a large and statistically 
significant effect of precolonial centralization on contemporary bureaucratic quality in Africa.  
                                                                 
24 When classifying Somalia as an Italian colony, our results do not change in any fundamental way. 
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The positive relationship between ancient statehood and contemporary state capacity, however, 
becomes less strong and less statistically significant the further we go back in time (Figure A4.1). 
This empirical finding has received no attention by Gennaioli and Rainer (2006).25 Their results 
may suggest that the link between precolonial centralization and institutional quality has been 
persistent throughout the entire independence era. This is not the case, however, when it comes 
to bureaucratic capacity. Correlating ancient statehood with bureaucratic quality in 1986, for 
example, one can clearly observe that the positive relationship between precolonial centralization 
and state capacity is not yet visible. Our observations are confirmed by a regression analysis using 
bureaucratic quality in 1986 as dependent variable (Table 8).26 The coefficients of all colonial 
dummies are, in turn, highly statistically significant. Our results suggest that the positive link 
between ancient statehood and contemporary state capacity in Africa has only started to become 
strong from the mid-1990s onwards. 
Moreover, we observe a significant, negative relationship between precolonial centralization and 
foreign aid dependence for the entire period 1984-2014 and both sub-periods, 1984-1995 and 
1996-2014 (Figure A4.2). All previous studies investigating the link between institutional capacity 
and foreign aid dependence in Africa, however, failed to control for precolonial centralization. 
We therefore have reason to believe that their regression results may suffer from endogeneity 
problems in the form of omitted variable bias. Based on the findings from the static analysis we 
will now return to the dynamic analysis this time controlling for precolonial centralization.  
4.3. Aid Dependence, Precolonial Centralisation and Changes in Bureaucratic Capacity  
In this section we will basically repeat the analysis from section 4.1, but we will now control for 
precolonial centralization. Controlling for precolonial centralization may be counterintuitive at 
first, since we are already controlling for the initial level of bureaucratic quality. The initial level of 
bureaucratic quality should help to account for idiosyncratic time-invariant initial conditions such 
as geographic location, cultural heritage, ethno-linguistic fractionalization, or precolonial 
centralization. However, we have found that the positive relationship between precolonial 
centralization and bureaucratic quality has become more pronounced over time. It is for this 
reason we control for precolonial centralization in our regression specification. In columns (1)-
(10) in Table 9 we report our results for the full time period. 
                                                                 
25 In their study, Gennaioli and Rainer (2006) find a positive correlation between precolonial centralization and two 
proxies for institutional quality, (i) rule of law and (ii) control of corruption for the time period 1996-2004. 
26 Even though the Bureaucratic Quality index published by the PRS Group covers the time period 1984-2014, the 
index is only available from 1986 onwards for several African countries. As a consequence thereof, we use 
bureaucratic quality in 1986 as dependent variable to cover more African countries. Results are, however, similar for 
the year 1984 and can be found in Appendix 4. 
Table 7: Precolonial Centralization and State Capacity in 2014, OLS estimates 
Dependent Variable: 
Bureaucratic Quality, 2014 
OLS 
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
OLS 
(3) 
OLS 
(4) 
OLS 
(5) 
OLS 
(6) 
OLS 
(7) 
OLS 
(8) 
OLS 
(9) 
OLS 
(10) 
OLS 
(11) 
OLS 
(12) 
             
Precolonial Centralization 1.31*** 1.30** 1.26*** 1.30** 1.11** 1.22* 1.33*** 1.37** 1.32*** 1.29** 1.41*** 1.64*** 
  (0.32) (0.53) (0.36) (0.56) (0.45) (0.67) (0.34) (0.53) (0.33) (0.54) (0.36) (0.55) 
             
British   0.52* 0.73**         
   (0.26) (0.30)         
             
French   0.33 0.50**         
   (0.25) (0.23)         
             
Belgian   -1.04*** -0.96**         
   (0.19) (0.36)         
             
Portuguese   0.40 0.52         
   (0.38) (0.40)         
             
Mean GDP per Capita, 61-13     0.13 0.23       
     (0.15) (0.20)       
             
Mean Aid Dependence, 61-13     -0.98 -0.62       
      (1.21) (1.52)       
             
Mean Domestic Violence, 61-13     -0.11 -0.12       
      (0.07) (0.10)       
             
Mean External Violence, 61-13     0.91 0.71       
      (1.15) (1.46)       
             
Oil Production Dummy, 61-13     -0.23 -0.47       
     (0.28) (0.51)       
             
Legal Origin       0.23 0.30     
       (0.22) (0.27)     
             
Population Density in 1400         0.06 0.01   
         (0.09) (0.16)   
             
Partitioned 
  
          0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
             
Constant 0.56** 0.70 0.22 -0.03 0.05 -0.69 0.45 0.50 0.42 0.70 0.47 -0.12 
 (0.24) (0.70) (0.23) (0.67) (0.96) (1.68) (0.28) (0.72) (0.34) (0.71) (0.36) (0.69) 
Observations 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 32 32 
Geography controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
R2 0.29 0.33 0.42 0.46 0.36 0.42 0.32 0.36 0.26 0.33 0.34 0.45 
adj. R2 0.27 0.20 0.33 0.26 0.24 0.16 0.28 0.21 0.30 0.17 0.29 0.29 
Notes: The variables GDP per capita and Population Density are log transformed. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, *at the 10% 
level. Geography controls are Latitude, Log Mountainous Terrain, % of cultivated land in Köppen–Geiger climate zone A (humid climate with no winter), % of cultivated land in Köppen–Geiger climate zone B (dry climate with 
no winter) and Mean distance to nearest coastline or sea-navigable river (km). 
Table 8: Precolonial Centralization and State Capacity in 1986, OLS estimates 
Dependent Variable: 
Bureaucratic Quality, 1986 
OLS 
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
OLS 
(3) 
OLS 
(4) 
OLS 
(5) 
OLS 
(6) 
OLS 
(7) 
OLS 
(8) 
OLS 
(9) 
OLS 
(10) 
OLS 
(11) 
OLS 
(12) 
             
Precolonial Centralization 0.28 -0.21 0.29 -0.18 -0.03 -0.60 0.25 -0.38 0.14 -0.18 0.52 0.11 
 (0.65) (0.83) (0.60) (0.89) (0.58) (0.85) (0.68) (0.81) (0.66) (0.84) (0.64) (0.93) 
             
British   1.44*** 1.29***         
   (0.33) (0.41)         
             
French   1.91*** 2.08***         
   (0.32) (0.41)         
             
Belgian   0.93*** 2.10***         
   (0.17) (0.73)         
             
Portuguese   1.63*** 1.38***         
   (0.29) (0.34)         
             
Mean GDP per Capita, 61-86     0.65** 0.20       
      (0.28) (0.30)       
             
Mean Aid Dependence, 61-86     -1.04 -2.16       
      (1.27) (1.29)       
             
Mean Domestic Violence, 61-86     -0.10 -0.14       
      (0.12) (0.10)       
             
Mean External Violence, 61-86     1.31 -0.42       
      (0.86) (1.21)       
             
Oil Production, 61-86     -0.70 0.52       
      (0.58) (0.67)       
             
Legal Origin       -0.31 -0.66*     
       (0.41) (0.34)     
             
Population Density in 1400         -0.25 -0.13   
         (0.18) (0.20)   
             
Partitioned 
 
          0.00 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
             
Constant 1.43*** 2.63** -0.12 1.07 -2.23 1.75 1.57*** 3.09*** 1.61*** 2.61** 1.33** 1.84 
 (0.41) (1.20) (0.27) (0.99) (1.83) (2.49) (0.49) (1.04) (0.45) (1.19) (0.52) (1.39) 
Observations 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 31 31 
Geography controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
R2 0.01 0.23 0.17 0.44 0.23 0.44 0.03 0.30 0.05 0.23 0.03 0.26 
adj. R2 -0.02 0.07 0.04 0.22 0.07 0.18 -0.03 0.13 -0.01 0.04 -0.04 0.04 
Notes: The variables GDP per capita and Population Density are log transformed. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, *at the 10% 
level. Geography controls are Latitude, Log Mountainous Terrain, % of cultivated land in Köppen–Geiger climate zone A (humid climate with no winter), % of cultivated land in Köppen–Geiger climate zone B (dry climate with 
no winter) and Mean distance to nearest coastline or sea-navigable river (km). 
 Table 9: Aid Dependence, Precolonial Centralization and Change in Bureaucratic Quality, 1984-2014, OLS estimates 
Dependent Variable: 
∆ Bureaucratic Quality, 1984-2014 
OLS 
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
OLS 
(3) 
OLS 
(4) 
OLS 
(5) 
OLS 
(6) 
OLS 
(7) 
OLS 
(8) 
OLS 
(9) 
OLS 
(10) 
           
Initial Bureaucratic Quality -1.01*** -1.01*** -1.00*** -1.01*** -1.06*** -1.06*** -1.08*** -1.07*** -1.00*** -1.01*** 
 (0.12) (0.09) (0.11) (0.09) (0.11) (0.10) (0.12) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) 
           
Mean Aid Dependence, 1984-2013 -5.55*** -3.03* -5.11*** -3.10 -4.95*** -3.18* -4.65*** -2.81 -6.91*** -4.78* 
  (1.63) (1.74) (1.53) (1.91) (1.38) (1.71) (1.49) (1.73) (1.82) (2.35) 
           
Precolonial Centralization  1.15***  1.01**  0.90*  1.00**  0.99** 
   (0.38)  (0.44)  (0.45)  (0.44)  (0.43) 
           
∆ Relative GDP per capita, 1984-2013   0.30* 0.15 0.15 0.04 0.29* 0.14 0.29* 0.15 
   (0.16) (0.17) (0.15) (0.14) (0.16) (0.16) (0.15) (0.15) 
           
Mean Ethnic Tensions, 1984-2013     -0.27** -0.23*     
      (0.11) (0.12)     
           
Mean Domestic Violence, 1984-2013       -0.15** -0.15**   
       (0.07) (0.07)   
           
Mean External Violence, 1984-2013       0.17** 0.07   
        (0.08) (0.07)   
           
Oil Production Dummy, 1984-2013         -0.38 -0.35 
         (0.30) (0.30) 
           
Constant 1.69*** 0.89** 1.52*** 0.90** 2.41*** 1.71*** 1.72*** 1.10*** 1.80*** 1.17** 
 (0.24) (0.36) (0.24) (0.38) (0.42) (0.56) (0.25) (0.38) (0.33) (0.45) 
Observations 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 
R2 0.70 0.77 0.73 0.77 0.76 0.79 0.76 0.80 0.74 0.78 
adj. R2 0.68 0.74 0.70 0.74 0.73 0.76 0.71 0.75 0.70 0.75 
Notes:  Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, *at the 10% level. 
 
Odd-numbered columns report the effect of foreign aid on bureaucratic quality not controlling 
for precolonial centralization. Those are the estimation results already reported in Table 4 and 
will not be discussed in great length again. Even-numbered columns do control for precolonial 
centralization. Our results are very intriguing. First, the negative relationship between foreign aid 
dependence and bureaucratic quality becomes weaker. Second, the precolonial centralization 
variable enters positively and statistically significantly in our regression estimations. The effect 
remains robust after controlling for relative changes in GDP per capita, average ethnic tensions, 
average political violence and average oil production for the period under consideration. 
Increasing GDP per capita is associated with an improving bureaucratic quality, even though the 
effect is only statistically significant in some of the specifications. Not surprisingly, ethnic 
tensions and domestic politic violence are negatively linked to bureaucratic performance. Both 
effects are statistically significant. External violence contributes to state capacity building, even 
though the effect is no longer statistically significant after controlling for precolonial 
centralization. In a similar vein, the coefficient for oil production is not statistically significant. 
Moreover, we once again find a strong regression-to-the-mean effect. When controlling for 
precolonial centralization, the adjusted R squared increases in each regression specification 
suggesting an improved goodness of fit of our model. Overall, when controlling for precolonial 
centralization, the regression estimations presented in Table 9 can explain between 77 and 80 
percent of the variation in changes of bureaucratic quality over time. 
Table 10 repeats the same analysis for the time period 1984-1995. Odd-numbered columns 
reproduce previous results from Table 5 where we do not control for precolonial centralization. 
When controlling for precolonial centralization in the even-numbered columns, the coefficient 
on foreign aid dependence remains fairly stable and highly statistically significant in most cases. 
The coefficient on precolonial centralization, however, is not statistically significant and even 
changes signs after adding control variables to the regression model. We do not want to 
overemphasize the negative sign of the precolonial centralization coefficient. However, when 
controlling for precolonial centralization, there is stronger evidence for a negative effect of aid 
dependence on state capacity for the sub-period 1984-1995 in comparison with the entire thirty 
year period.  
The next step is to look at the relationship between aid dependence and bureaucratic quality for 
the second sub-period (Table 11). We observe that without controlling for precolonial 
centralization the coefficient on foreign aid dependence is always negative but only statistically 
significant in two out of five cases. When controlling for precolonial centralization, the negative 
relationship between foreign aid dependence and bureaucratic quality weakens considerably and 
Table 10: Aid Dependence, Precolonial Centralization and Change in Bureaucratic Quality, 1984-1995, OLS estimates 
Dependent Variable: 
∆ Bureaucratic Quality, 1984-1995 
OLS 
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
OLS 
(3) 
OLS 
(4) 
OLS 
(5) 
OLS 
(6) 
OLS 
(7) 
OLS 
(8) 
OLS 
(9) 
OLS 
(10) 
           
Initial Bureaucratic Quality -0.60*** -0.60*** -0.64*** -0.64*** -0.63*** -0.63*** -0.64*** -0.64*** -0.65*** -0.65*** 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) 
           
Mean Aid Dependence, 1984-1995 -4.33*** -4.00** -4.48*** -4.61*** -4.48*** -4.61*** -4.43*** -4.49*** -3.27** -3.44* 
  (1.30) (1.61) (1.11) (1.55) (1.13) (1.57) (1.18) (1.63) (1.43) (1.78) 
           
Precolonial Centralization  0.24  -0.09  -0.09  -0.04  -0.13 
   (0.57)  (0.59)  (0.60)  (0.60)  (0.56) 
           
∆ Relative GDP per capita, 1984-1995   0.81 0.85 0.82 0.87 0.77 0.79 0.95** 1.01* 
    (0.49) (0.54) (0.60) (0.61) (0.51) (0.56) (0.46) (0.52) 
           
Mean Ethnic Tensions, 1984-1995     0.01 0.01     
      (0.14) (0.14)     
           
Mean Domestic Violence, 1984-1995       -0.05 -0.04   
       (0.05) (0.05)   
           
Mean External Violence, 1984-1995       1.21 1.25   
       (1.21) (1.11)   
           
Oil Production Dummy, 1984-1995         0.42 0.43 
         (0.32) (0.32) 
           
Constant 1.37*** 1.21** 1.48*** 1.54*** 1.45*** 1.51* 1.53*** 1.56*** 1.26*** 1.35** 
 (0.24) (0.47) (0.24) (0.53) (0.52) (0.80) (0.27) (0.55) (0.32) (0.57) 
Observations 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 
R2 0.46 0.47 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.53 0.54 
adj. R2 0.43 0.42 0.46 0.44 0.44 0.43 0.43 0.41 0.47 0.46 
Notes:  Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, *at the 10% level. 
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Table 11: Aid Dependence, Precolonial Centralization and Change in Bureaucratic Quality, 1996-2014, OLS estimates 
Dependent Variable: 
∆ Bureaucratic Quality, 1996-2014 
OLS 
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
OLS 
(3) 
OLS 
(4) 
OLS 
(5) 
OLS 
(6) 
OLS 
(7) 
OLS 
(8) 
OLS 
(9) 
OLS 
(10) 
           
Initial Bureaucratic Quality -0.75*** -0.75*** -0.77*** -0.76*** -0.80*** -0.79*** -0.81*** -0.80*** -0.74*** -0.73*** 
 (0.14) (0.12) (0.14) (0.13) (0.15) (0.14) (0.17) (0.15) (0.14) (0.13) 
           
Mean Aid Dependence, 1996-2013 -3.63** -1.12 -4.63 -1.36 -3.88 -1.42 -4.39 -1.60 -7.31** -3.93 
 (1.71) (2.11) (2.94) (3.24) (2.63) (3.15) (2.78) (3.11) (3.41) (3.77) 
           
Precolonial Centralization   1.06**  1.05**  0.86**  0.95**  1.02** 
   (0.39)  (0.41)  (0.41)  (0.42)  (0.40) 
           
∆ Relative GDP per capita, 1996-2013   0.10 0.02 0.04 -0.01 0.06 -0.00 0.18 0.10 
    (0.16) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.15) (0.15) 
           
Mean Ethnic Tensions, 1996-2013     -0.24** -0.17*     
      (0.09) (0.10)     
           
Mean Domestic Violence, 1996-2013       -0.15** -0.13**   
       (0.06) (0.06)   
           
Mean External Violence, 1996-2013       0.69 0.40   
       (0.52) (0.53)   
           
Oil Production Dummy, 1996-2013         -0.48* -0.45* 
          (0.24) (0.25) 
           
Constant 1.12*** 0.39 1.15*** 0.40 1.82*** 1.02* 1.32*** 0.65 1.43*** 0.68 
 (0.32) (0.38) (0.32) (0.41) (0.47) (0.54) (0.41) (0.47) (0.42) (0.49) 
Observations 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 
R2 0.50 0.60 0.50 0.60 0.58 0.64 0.57 0.65 0.54 0.64 
adj. R2 0.47 0.57 0.46 0.55 0.52 0.58 0.50 0.58 0.49 0.58 
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, *at the 10% level. 
 
is no longer statistically significant in any of the five specifications. In contrast, the odd-
numbered columns document a fairly strong positive and statistically significant relationship 
between precolonial centralization and changes in bureaucratic quality. This implies that, on 
average, countries with highly centralized precolonial institutions improved their bureaucratic 
quality over the time period 1996-2014 by more than countries with highly decentralized 
precolonial political systems. That is, relative to “deeper” factors, aid appears less important than 
both aid optimists and pessimists would argue.  
Furthermore, we no longer find any empirical support for the modified Burnside-Dollar 
hypothesis in the latter period when controlling for precolonial centralization (Table 12). At the 
same time, we once again find a strong positive relationship between precolonial centralization 
and improvements in bureaucratic quality.29 Summarizing, we neither find support for the aid 
pessimists nor the conditional optimists when controlling for precolonial centralization. Instead, 
our results indicate that precolonial centralization “trumps” foreign aid dependence when trying 
to explain changes in bureaucratic quality on the African continent for the period 1996-2014. 
In this section we have documented a strong link between precolonial centralization and 
bureaucratic quality. For both the entire period 1984-2014 and the latter period 1996-2014, the 
aid dependence variable loses most of  its explanatory power when controlling for precolonial 
centralization. The positive relationship between precolonial centralization and changes 
bureaucratic quality survives additional controls for the periods 1984-2014 and 1996-2014. For 
the early period, however, the strong and positive link between the two variables is not visible. 
When controls are added, there is no significant relationship between precolonial centralization 
and changes in bureaucratic quality between 1984 and 1995.  
One interpretation of these findings would be that with the arrival of colonialism on the African 
continent, new colonial institutions were superimposed on pre-existing precolonial institutions. 
In the early years of independence, the colonial institutions had a strong influence on 
bureaucratic institutions and capabilities. As years passed, the temporary colonial influences faded 
and precolonial institutions reasserted their importance and increasingly shaped bureaucratic 
quality. Our results provide further empirical evidence for the importance of precolonial 
centralization in shaping contemporary state capacity in Africa. Our quantitative findings, 
however, only partially lend support for the historical continuity of indigenous political 
institutions in Africa (Gennaioli & Rainer, 2006). 
                                                                 
29 The results for the full period and early period are presented in Appendix 3. 
Table 12: Aid Dependence, Precolonial Centralization and Change in Bureaucratic Quality  
controlling for initial conditions, 1996-2014, OLS estimates 
Dependent Variable: OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
∆ Bureaucratic Quality, 1996-2014 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
           
Initial Bureaucratic Quality -0.85*** -0.78*** -0.94*** -0.81*** -0.96*** -0.85*** -0.93*** -0.80*** -0.89*** -0.75*** 
 (0.15) (0.12) (0.16) (0.14) (0.16) (0.15) (0.19) (0.16) (0.14) (0.14) 
           
Mean Aid Dependence, 1996-2013 -5.33*** -1.60 -8.70*** -2.74 -7.54** -3.18 -7.30** -1.68 -10.30*** -4.26 
 (1.85) (1.88) (3.09) (3.95) (2.97) (3.87) (3.49) (3.91) (3.45) (4.15) 
           
Mean Aid Dependence, 1996-2013 2.58 0.61 4.07* 1.13 3.62 1.45 2.82 0.07 3.36* 0.30 
 x Initial Bureaucratic Quality (1.72) (1.86) (2.08) (2.30) (2.30) (2.40) (2.09) (2.28) (1.97) (2.26) 
           
Precolonial Centralization  1.03**  0.97**  0.75  0.94**  1.00** 
  (0.40)  (0.46)  (0.46)  (0.46)  (0.44) 
           
∆ Relative GDP per capita, 1996-2013   0.24 0.07 0.17 0.05 0.16 0.00 0.28* 0.11 
   (0.16) (0.17) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) 
           
Mean Ethnic Tensions, 1996-2013     -0.23** -0.17*     
      (0.09) (0.10)     
           
Mean Domestic Violence, 1996-2013       -0.13** -0.13*   
       (0.06) (0.07)   
           
Mean External Violence, 1996-2013       0.52 0.40   
        (0.53) (0.55)   
           
Oil Production Dummy, 1996-2013         -0.42* -0.44 
         (0.24) (0.27) 
           
Constant 1.22*** 0.43 1.36*** 0.51 1.97*** 1.18* 1.46*** 0.65 1.56*** 0.71 
 (0.33) (0.38) (0.33) (0.46) (0.46) (0.59) (0.42) (0.51) (0.41) (0.50) 
Observations 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 
R2 0.51 0.60 0.54 0.61 0.60 0.64 0.58 0.65 0.57 0.64 
adj. R2 0.47 0.55 0.48 0.54 0.54 0.57 0.50 0.56 0.50 0.57 
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, *at the 10% level. 
5. ROBUSTNESS 
This section presents some additional robustness checks. Section 5.1 addresses potential 
endogeneity problems with regard to our static analysis. Section 5.2 tackles endogeneity concerns 
with regard to our dynamic analysis. 
5.1. 2SLS Estimates for Static Analysis 
Our previous OLS estimates may suffer from endogeneity bias. First, the positive relationship 
between precolonial centralization and bureaucratic quality might be driven by omitted variable 
bias. Time-variant non-observable factors may have driven both precolonial state formation and 
contemporary state capacity, potentially producing misleading cross-country estimates. Second, 
Murdock’s (1967) classification of precolonial centralization as proxy for the level of ancient 
statehood is subject to the critique that it may contain sizeable measurement error 
(Michalopoulos & Papaioannou, 2015). In order to overcome the endogeneity problems, we 
instrument precolonial centralization with the TseTse fly suitability index (TSI) developed by 
Alsan (2015). In her empirical study, Alsan constructs the TSI at the regional level for 522 
mainland-associated ethnic groups. She argues that ethnic groups inhabiting TseTse suitable areas 
were less likely to be politically centralized at the regional level. The detrimental impact of the 
TseTse fly on precolonial centralization goes through subsistence patterns “which influence 
settlement structure, population density, occupational specialization, and fiscal capacity, as well as 
[…] transportation costs” (Alsan, 2015, p. 389).30  
In order to construct a TSI index at the national level, we use land area of ethnic groups as 
weight. Data on land area at the sub-regional level comes from Fenske (2014). We therefore join 
Alsan’s ethnic groups with Fenske’s land area data. Unfortunately, land area is not available for 
each mainland-associated ethnic group. This leaves us with 467 ethnic groups for which we have 
data on both the TSI and land area. We then sort the 467 mainland-associated ethnic groups 
according to country. Since the dataset only includes mainland-associated ethnic groups, we have 
no data for the islands of Africa, e.g. Cape Verde, Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Sao Tomé 
and Principe and Seychelles. Moreover, there are no observations for the mainland countries of 
Djibouti, Gambia and Lesotho. Our data show huge variations in terms of ethnic groups per 
country. While we have 60 observations for Nigeria (Igbo, Yoruba, Woodabe, Kanuri, among 
                                                                 
30 As previously discussed, low population density and high transportation costs are commonly viewed as two major 
obstacles to state formation in Africa (Bates, 2001; Herbst, 2000). According to Alsan, those two variables are 
particularly affected by the TseTse, as “(…) low population densities, in general, are favored if communicable disease 
(e.g., sleeping sickness) is highly prevalent since it reduces the probability of pathogen transmission. Transport costs 
would have been affected by the TseTse since sending messages, carrying goods or military transport over land 
would have been hampered by the lack of large domesticated animals” (Alsan, 2015, p. 388-389). 
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others), we have only two observations for Somalia (Somali, Bajun), and only one observation for 
Swaziland (Swazi). We then calculate the national TSI for each country. The following example 
for Somalia aims to clarify our methodology. The TSI and land area for the Somali people, the 
largest ethnic group in Somalia, are equal to 0.490 and 58.902, respectively. The TSI and land area 
for the Bajun people, an ethnic minority group, are equal to 0.370 and 0.697. The total land area 
therefore equals 59.599. The TSI for the Somali people receives a weight of 0.9883 
(58.902/59.599), while the TSI for the Bajun people get assigned a weight of only 0.0117 
(0.697/59.5999). The national TSI for Somalia is equal to 0.4903208*0.9883 + 0.3703742*0.0117 
= 0.489. The TSI indicators for all 44 African countries are documented in Table A2.3. 
For the TSI to be a valid instrument, it must meet two conditions. First, the TSI must meet the 
instrument relevance condition. Variation in the TSI is related to variation in precolonial 
centralization. Moreover, our instrument must meet the instrument exogeneity condition. If the 
TSI is exogenous, it must be uncorrelated with the error term ui. Or put differently, we must rule 
out any direct effect of the instrument on the dependent variable or any effect running through 
omitted variables (Angrist, Imbens, & Rubin, 1996).  
Table 13 reports the 2SLS estimates of the precolonial centralization coefficient. The first stage 
regressions results are excluded due to limited space but are available upon request. Column (1) 
shows the strong relationship between precolonial centralization and bureaucratic quality in 2014 
for our base specification. The corresponding 2SLS estimate of the impact of precolonial 
centralization on bureaucratic quality is 1.74. The coefficient remains highly statistically 
significant and is in fact larger than the OLS estimate reported in Table 7. This may therefore 
suggest that the coefficient of precolonial centralization in the uninstrumented regression in the 
first column of Table 7 suffered from attenuation bias (Wooldridge, 2002). The attenuation bias 
resulting from measurement error in the precolonial centralization variable would therefore be 
more important than omitted variable bias.31 Column (2) shows that controlling for colonizer 
identity does not change the strong positive relationship. In a similar way, the positive link 
between precolonial statehood and contemporary state capacity remains intact after controlling 
for proximate determinants of contemporary state capacity (column 3), legal origin (column 4), 
population density in 1400 (column 5) and artificial state characteristics (column 6). Overall, the 
2SLS estimates always remain (highly) statistically significant and are always larger than the 
coefficients from our OLS estimates in Table 7. Additional 2SLS results using alternative control 
variables can be found in Appendix 3.  
                                                                 
31 Endogeneity problems due to simultaneity bias/reverse causality are obviously of little concern here.  
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Table 13: Precolonial Centralization and State Capacity in 2014, 2SLS estimates 
Dependent Variable: 
Bureaucratic Quality, 2014 
2SLS 
 (1) 
2SLS 
 (2) 
2SLS 
(3) 
2SLS 
(4) 
2SLS 
(5) 
2SLS 
(6) 
       
Precolonial Centralization 1.74*** 1.45*** 1.46** 1.68*** 1.76*** 1.50*** 
 (0.62) (0.56) (0.72) (0.60) (0.65) (0.58) 
       
British  0.43*     
  (0.22)     
       
French  0.33     
  (0.23)     
       
Belgian  -1.08***     
  (0.16)     
       
Portuguese  0.38     
  (0.36)     
       
Mean GDP per Capita, 61-13   0.10    
   (0.14)    
       
Mean Aid Dependence, 61-13   -0.83    
   (1.39)    
       
Mean Domestic Violence, 61-13   -0.11    
    (0.07)    
       
Mean External Violence, 61-13   0.44    
    (1.27)    
       
Oil Production Dummy, 61-13   -0.19    
    (0.26)    
       
Legal Origin    0.18   
    (0.22)   
       
Population Density in 1400     0.04  
     (0.10)  
       
Partitioned 
 
     0.00 
(0.00) 
       
Constant 0.30 0.14 0.03 0.25 0.27 0.41 
 (0.42) (0.26) (0.95) (0.45) (0.44) (0.46) 
Observations 35 35 35 35 35 31 
R2, second stage 0.29 0.43 0.37 0.31 0.29 0.38 
adj. R2, second stage 0.27 0.33 0.24 0.27 0.24 0.33 
F-statistic, first stage 
Wooldridge's heteroskedasticity-robust 
score test (p-value in brackets) 
14.30 
.435  
(0.510) 
12.06 
.071 
(0.790) 
7.28 
.258 
(0.611) 
13.68 
.368 
(0.544) 
11.88 
.435   
(0.510) 
13.74 
.015   
(0.903) 
Notes: The variables GDP per capita and Population Density are log transformed. Robust standard errors are shown in 
parentheses. ***denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, *at the 10% level. The instrument for 
precolonial centralization is the “national” TSI which is constructed by the authors. 
 
In all but one case, the instrument we rely on is strong, since our first-stage F-statistics exceed the 
rule-of-thumb threshold of 10 (Staiger & Stock, 1997; Stock & Watson, 2012). We cannot answer 
the question whether our instrument meets the exogeneity condition. As our regression 
coefficients are exactly identified, we cannot deploy a test of overidentifying restrictions.  We can, 
36 
 
however, test whether or not precolonial centralization or one of the other explanatory variables 
are highly endogenous. The most commonly used test is the Hausman test (Hausman, 1978). 
Since the Hausman test assumes homoskedasticity of the residuals, we used Wooldridge’s (1995) 
heteroskedasticty-robust score test instead. The test score and the associated p-value are reported 
in Table 13 as well. In all six cases, Wooldridge’s score test fails to reject reject the null hypothesis 
that our variable precolonial centralization is exogenous at all conventional significance levels. 32 If 
the endogenous regressor is in fact exogenous, then the OLS estimator is more efficient. Based 
on this analysis, we will treat precolonial centralization as exogenous for the rest of the analysis. 
Summarizing, similar to Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2015) who look at the relationship 
between precolonial centralization and contemporary development at the regional level, we 
document a strengthening of the association between precolonial centralization and 
contemporary state capacity at the national level after accounting for the potential endogeneity of 
precolonial centralization. Our econometric analysis, however, shows that our concerns with 
endogeneity are to a large extent unwarranted. Empirical regularities by previous studies both at 
the national and sub-national level (Gennaioli & Rainer, 2006, 2007; Michalopoulos & 
Papaioannou, 2013) should therefore remain intact. 
 
5.2. 2SLS Estimates for Dynamic Analysis 
In this section we address the endogeneity problem between foreign aid dependence and changes 
in bureaucratic quality. On the one hand, more aid could flow to countries with conditions 
impeding institutional change, as there is no evidence that less corrupt government or less 
authoritarian regimes receive more aid (Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Alesina & Weder, 2002). On the 
other hand, foreign aid may predominantly flow to countries whose bureaucratic capacity is 
improving as the return of aid is biggest in a sound institutional environment (Burnside & Dollar, 
1997, 2000). In order to correct for potential reverse causality, we need to instrument for foreign 
aid dependence.  
One of our instruments is population size. Population size captures the strategic interests of 
donor countries, as “there is an exogenous small country bias in aid such that smaller countries 
get higher aid per capita and higher aid as ratio to their income” (Easterly, 2009, p. 388). 
Moreover, Knack and Rahman (2007) show that the relationship between population size and 
bureaucratic quality is both theoretically and empirically weak. This suggests that our first 
                                                                 
32 Assuming homoskedasticity, we deploy the Durbin and Wu–Hausman tests as well for all six regression 
specifications in Table 10. Both tests arrive at the same conclusion that precolonial centralization can be treated as 
exogenous. The results are available upon request. 
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instrument may satisfy the relevance and exogeneity condition. Our second instrument is the 
initial development level, proxied by GDP per capita (log transformed). This instrument captures 
needs-based preferences and altruistic motives of aid. Generally, more development assistance 
goes to poor countries (Riddell, 2007). The exogeneity assumption is valid if we assume that low-
income African aid recipients are not directly more vulnerable to institutional deterioration than 
their high-income counterparts. Both the population data and the GDP per capita data come 
from Maddison (2010) and from the World Development Indicators. 
Ideally, we would like to use the initial population size and the initial development level for the 
period under consideration as instruments. We find, however, that population size at the 
beginning of the decade of the period under consideration is a much stronger instrument for aid 
dependence than initial population size. This result is perhaps surprising and we do not have an 
intuitive explanation for it. We therefore use the initial development level and population size at 
the beginning of the decade of the period under consideration as instruments for aid dependence. 
Since the two variables are uncorrelated among themselves, any linear combination is valid as 
well.33 Using a linear combination of the two also allows us to deploy the test of overidentifying 
restrictions, which tests whether our instruments are purely exogenous. As mentioned before, we 
will not instrument for precolonial centralization, as we think this variable can be considered 
exogenous.34 
Table 14 presents our 2SLS estimates for the dynamic analysis covering the full period. In the 
base specification (column 1), the coefficient on aid dependence is negative but not statistically 
significant. In contrast, however, and similar to our OLS estimates, the coefficient on precolonial 
centralization is positive and statistically significant. Our empirical results remain intact after 
controlling for change in GDP per capita (column 2), ethnic tensions (column 3), domestic and 
external violence (column 4) and oil wealth (column 5). The coefficients on both ethnic tension 
and domestic violence are statistically significant, confirming previous theoretical and empirical 
                                                                 
33 The correlation between log GDP per capita in 1984 and population in 1980 is -0.0723 and is not statistically 
significant at all conventional significance levels. In a similar way, the correlation between log GDP per capita in 
1996 and population in 1990 is -0.0977 and not statistically significant at all conventional significance levels. 
34 While we believe that these instrumental variables are reasonable in the context of regressions where bureaucratic 
capacity is the outcome variable, we cannot fully guarantee the validity of our instruments, and we wish to emphasize 
that we think of the estimates in this section primarily as checks on the robustness of the OLS estimates. We 
considered novel instruments for foreign aid, along the lines of Dreher, Eichenauer and Gehring (2013), Galiani, 
Knack, Xu and Zou (2014) as well as Nunn and Qian (2014), but we did not find them suitable for the following 
reasons: First, the aforementioned authors instrument for foreign aid over time intervals of shorter lengths than used 
here, and their instrumental variables are better suited for regressons based on such (shorter) time-spans. More 
specifically, their studies use panel data with time periods between one and four years, while we work with 
significantly longer time-spans. Second, the contributions by Dreher et al. (2013) and Galiani et al. (2014) in 
particular investigate the effect of foreign aid on economic growth, while the study by Nunn and Qian (2014) 
examines the relationship between food aid from the United States exclusively and conflict in the recipient country. 
Our paper, however, discusses the impact of foreign aid on bureaucratic capacity, a fundamentally different concept.  
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work on the origins of contemporary state capacity and institutional quality (Alesina et al., 2003; 
Besley & Persson, 2008, 2011). The relationship between changes in bureaucratic quality and (i) 
external violence as well as (ii) oil wealth remains weak. Similar to our OLS estimates, the 
coefficient on initial bureaucratic quality is negative and highly statistically significant capturing a 
regression-to-the-mean effect. Countries that initially score either very high or very low on the 
bureaucratic quality index move, on average, closer to the mean.  
In four out of five cases, the instruments we rely on appear to be valid. The first stage F-statistics 
are always above the critical rule-of-thumb threshold of 10, except in column (5). Moreover, our 
instruments appear to satisfy the exogeneity assumption as can be interpreted from the high p 
values for the Hansen’s J-test of overidentification. In all cases, we fail to reject the null 
hypothesis that our two instruments are exogenous.  
Table 14: Aid Dependence, Precolonial Centralization and Change in Bureaucratic 
Quality, 1984-2014, 2SLS estimates  
Dependent Variable:  2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
∆ Bureaucratic Quality, 1984-2014  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
       
Initial Bureaucratic Quality  -1.00*** -1.00*** -1.04*** -1.06*** -1.02*** 
  (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) 
       
Mean Aid Dependence, 1984-2013  -1.29 -2.08 -1.36 -1.87 -5.43 
  (2.92) (3.03) (2.49) (2.33) (5.50) 
       
Precolonial Centralization  1.28*** 1.09** 1.07** 1.19*** 1.08** 
  (0.44) (0.48) (0.43) (0.38) (0.51) 
       
∆ Relative GDP per capita, 1984-2013   0.15    
   (0.16)    
       
Mean Ethnic Tensions, 1984-2013    -0.23**   
    (0.11)   
       
Mean Domestic Violence, 1984-2013     -0.15**  
     (0.07)  
       
Mean External Violence, 1984-2013     0.05  
     (0.06)  
       
Oil Production Dummy, 1984-2013      -0.40 
      (0.44) 
       
Constant  0.68 0.78* 1.52*** 0.99*** 1.26 
  (0.45) (0.45) (0.56) (0.36) (0.79) 
Observations  36 36 36 36 36 
R2, second stage  0.76 0.77 0.79 0.79 0.78 
adj. R2, second stage  0.74 0.74 0.76 0.76 0.75 
F statistic, first stage  14.57 19.79 11.69 11.45 3.28 
Overidentifying restrictions,  1.271 1.760 0.122 0.504 2.010 
 J-test and p-value  (0.259) (0.185) (0.727) (0.478) (0.156) 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, *at the 10% 
level. Instruments in 2SLS for the period 1984-2014 and 1984-1995 include population in 1980 and initial log GDP 
per capita. Instruments in 2SLS for the period 1996-2014 include population in 1990 and initial log GDP per capita. 
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We now interpret the results for the two sub-periods (Table 15). While the aid coefficient is 
strongly negative and highly statistically significant in the early period, the effect of foreign aid on 
bureaucratic capacity remains ambiguous for the later period. Moreover, the negative effect of 
foreign aid on bureaucratic quality for the period 1984-1995 is now a lot stronger if compared to 
our OLS estimates in Table 10. Our intriguing finding on the relationship between precolonial 
centralization and the change in state capacity for the two-sub periods is similar to our OLS 
estimates in Table 10 and Table 11. While the link between the two variables is ambiguous for 
the early sub-period, the relationship is fairly strong and highly statistically significant for the 
1996-2014 period. Our main findings change very little after including other control variables. 
The first stage F-statistics are more often than not above the critical rule-of-thumb threshold of 
10, except in column (4) and column (5). Interestingly, our two instruments are somewhat weaker 
for the early sub-period if compared to the entire period and late sub-period. In all cases, we once 
again fail to reject the null hypothesis that our two instruments are exogenous.  
With regard to foreign aid dependence, our 2SLS results suggest that foreign aid was damaging to 
bureaucratic capacity in the period 1984-1995 but not necessarily in the period 1996-2014, even 
after controlling for precolonial centralization. With regard to our positive precolonial 
centralization coefficient for the period 1996-2014, our tentative interpretation goes as follows. 
From the early and mid-1990s onwards, precolonial institutional characteristics exert an 
increasing influence on present bureaucratic capacity in a majority of African countries. While a 
majority of African countries officially gained independence in the 1960s, most of them were still 
profoundly vulnerable to external political and economic pressures during the entire postcolonial 
era (Meredith, 2005). In fact, a bulk of African countries found themselves struggling for true 
independence until the early 1990s. Worsening economic conditions, political crises, 
macroeconomic instability and the emerging debt crisis engulfed the majority of African 
countries in the 1980s. When the democratic wave swept across Africa in the 1990s as a result of 
the fall of communist regimes and the cessation of the Cold War, a majority of African countries 
slowly witnessed more varieties of freedom – press freedom, freedom of speech, freedom of 
movement and freedom of organization. It was during that period, when domestic institutional 
capacity was increasingly determined by precolonial levels of political centralisation. On average, 
countries with high precolonial political centralization witnessed an improvement in bureaucratic 
quality, while countries with highly fragmented precolonial political systems suffered from a 
decline in administrative capacity. Overall, our results highlight the historical legacy of the 
precolonial bureaucratic state in Africa. 
Table 15: Aid Dependence, Precolonial Centralization and Change in Bureaucratic Quality, 2SLS estimates 
Dependent Variable:   2SLS 
1984-1995 
 2SLS 
1996-2014 ∆ Bureaucratic Quality    
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
              
Initial Bureaucratic Quality   -0.63*** -0.68*** -0.64*** -0.64*** -0.63***  -0.68*** -0.67*** -0.68*** -0.76*** -0.70*** 
   (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)  (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
              
Mean Aid Dependence   -8.23** -10.04*** -8.16** -8.40** -10.44*  1.36 2.19 2.12 -0.28 -1.93 
   (3.31) (3.23) (3.31) (3.49) (5.67)  (3.30) (4.17) (3.40) (3.07) (3.83) 
              
Precolonial Centralization   -0.12 -0.68 -0.18 -0.12 -0.26  1.19*** 1.21*** 1.06*** 1.02** 1.09*** 
   (0.58) (0.57) (0.60) (0.59) (0.77)  (0.40) (0.42) (0.40) (0.40) (0.39) 
              
∆ Relative GDP per capita    1.21**      -0.09    
    (0.57)      (0.16)    
              
Mean Ethnic Tensions     -0.10      -0.16*   
     (0.12)      (0.09)   
              
Mean Domestic Violence      -0.05      -0.13**  
      (0.07)      (0.06)  
              
Mean External Violence      1.35      0.40  
      (1.24)      (0.49)  
              
Oil Production Dummy       -0.26      -0.38 
       (0.40)      (0.25) 
              
Constant   1.79*** 2.39*** 2.13*** 1.86*** 2.14**  0.06 0.02 0.50 0.47 0.50 
   (0.55) (0.57) (0.77) (0.60) (1.00)  (0.47) (0.48) (0.59) (0.46) (0.56) 
Observations   36 36 36 36 36  37 37 37 37 37 
R2, second stage   0.38 0.36 0.39 0.38 0.27  0.59 0.59 0.61 0.64 0.63 
adj. R2, second stage   0.32 0.28 0.31 0.27 0.17  0.55 0.53 0.56 0.59 0.59 
F statistic, first stage   10.29 11.44 10.07 9.44 4.73  16.87 19.83 17.06 15.93 11.05 
Overidentifying restrictions,   0.266 0.058 0.800 0.707 0.168  0.366 0.133 0.118 0.059 0.064 
 J-test and p-value   (0.606) (0.809) (0.371) (0.401) (0.682)  (0.545) (0.715) (0.731) (0.808) (0.800) 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, *at the 10% level. Instruments in 2SLS for the period 1984-1995 include 
population in 1980 and initial log GDP per capita. Instruments in 2SLS for the period 1996-2014 include population in 1990 and initial log GDP per capita. 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper we have empirically examined the ultimate and proximate determinants of 
contemporary state capacity in Africa. We set out to investigate the relationship between foreign 
aid and state capacity. Our initial results suggested that foreign aid may have a negative impact on 
bureaucratic capacity, with a mitigating effect coming from having a high initial level of capacity.   
While not fully comparable to previous studies on the effects of foreign aid - as our focus is on a 
different outcome (bureaucratic capacity rather than broader institutional measures or economic 
growth) - these initial results weakly resemble those of scholars such as Burnside and Dollar 
(1997, 2000). However, upon further exploration of deeper determinants of bureaucratic capacity, 
we have found that postcolonial experiences strongly predict the level of capacity of current-day 
states. Furthermore, the inclusion of precolonial centralization in our econometric analysis 
removes the estimated impact of foreign aid on the evolution of bureaucratic capacity in recent 
years. Hence, our results suggest that previous studies examining the link between aid and 
institutional quality in Africa may have suffered from omitted variables bias by not including 
measures of precolonial experience.  
Our work is closely related to a set of papers that find historical continuity of indigenous political 
institutions in Africa (Gennaioli & Rainer, 2006). However, in contrast to previous studies, we 
find that the strong link between precolonial centralization and modern bureaucratic capacity in 
Africa has only emerged from the mid-1990s onwards. In many African countries, colonial 
institutions were superimposed upon deeper institutional foundations. The postcolonial 
institutions resulting from colonial state legacies were often incongruent with precolonial 
systems. As the colonial period is slowly fading, the influence of precolonial political institutions 
on modern state capacity is reasserting itself. Consequently, our results provide further evidence 
for the importance of precolonial centralization in our understanding of present day economic 
and political developments on the continent (Gennaioli & Rainer, 2007; Michalopoulos & 
Papaioannou, 2013, 2014, 2015; Osafo-Kwaako & Robinson, 2013). 
Our quantitative empirical work calls for further research, both theoretical and empirical. While it 
appears clear from our findings that contemporary institutional development on the African 
continent has deep historical roots, the channels through which these roots shape modern states 
are less clear. A rich understanding of these channels is going to require a combination of 
quantitative and qualitative analysis, ideally accompanied by theory-development. In particular, 
we believe that future fieldwork and case studies will paint a more complete picture of the 
trajectory of institutional development and state capacity in Africa from precolonial times until 
today.   
 
 
APPENDIX 1: DATA AND SOURCES 
Dependent variable  
 
Bureaucratic Quality 
 
The quality of the bureaucracy is a proxy for institutional strength. Bureaucratic Quality tends to minimize revisions of pol icy when 
governments change. Therefore, high points are given to countries where the bureaucracy has the strength and expertise to govern 
without drastic changes in policy or interruptions in government services. In these low-risk countries, the bureaucracy tends to be 
somewhat autonomous from political pressure and tends to have an established mechanism for recruitment and training. Countries that 
lack the cushioning effect of a strong bureaucracy receive low points because a change in government tends to be traumatic in  terms of 
policy formulation and day-to-day administrative functions. Scale is 0-4.    
Source: ICRG Index from PRS Group  
Main explanatory variables  
  
Aid Dependence Annual total DAC-ODA Net Disbursements in current dollars. Western aid flows include net disbursements from DAC donors only. 
Gross Domestic Product is expressed in current dollars.    
Source: OECD/DAC database (2014) for Western aid flows in current dollars. World Development Indicators  from World Bank 
(2014) for GDP data in current dollars. 
 
Precolonial Centralization 
 
For each country, the index measures the share of the non-European population that belongs to indigenously "centralized" ethnic 
groups. Scale is 0-1. An ethnic group is defined as "centralized" if it has 2, 3, or 4 jurisdictional levels above the local community 
according to Murdock’s Jurisdictional Hierarchy variable. It is defined as "fragmented" if it has 0 or 1 levels. 
Source: Constructed by Gennaioli and Rainer (2007) using Murdock (1967) and Atlas Narodov Mira (Bruk & Apenchenko, 1964).
   
    
Control variables  
  
Historical determinants  
 
British 
 
French 
 
Belgian 
 
Portuguese 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the country was a former British colony. 
 
Dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the country was a former French colony. 
 
Dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the country was a former Belgian colony. 
 
Dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the country was a former Portuguese colony. 
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Slave Exports - (area) or 
 (population) 
 
 
 
 
 
Years of Independence 
 
 
 
 
State Antiquity Index 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Political determinants 
 
Years of ancient state history 
 
 
Vertical legitimacy 
a) Number of slave exports normalized by size, measured by land area in square kilometers.    
b) Number of slave exports normalized by size, measured by average population between 1400 and 1900.   
No slave exports are recorded for Botswana, Cape Verde, Comoros, Lesotho, Mauritius, Morocco, Rwanda, Sao Tomé and Principe, 
Swaziland, Seychelles and Tunisia. Because the natural logarithm of zero is undefined, the natural logarithm of 0.1 is taken for zero-
export countries. 
Source: Nunn (2008). http://scholar.harvard.edu/nunn/pages/data-0 
 
Years of a country’s independence from colonial rule. The only two African countries that were not colonized are Liberia and Ethiopia. 
Liberia proclaimed independence in 1847. We use the year 1855 as independence year for Ethiopia. In 1855 Ethiopia was reunified by 
the Emperor Tewodros II. Many historians view the coronation of Emperor Tewodros II as the beginning of Ethiopia's modern 
history. 
 
Measures the depth of experience with state-level institutions. The authors began dividing the period 1 to 1950 C.E. into 39 half 
centuries. Years before 1 C.E. were ignored on the grounds that the experience of more than 2000 years ago would be unlikely to have 
much effect today, and in order to avoid low-return research effort using low quality information. For each period of fifty years, they 
asked three questions (and allocated points) as follows: 
1.) Is there a government above the tribal level? (1 point if yes, 0 points if no) 
2.) Is this government foreign or locally based? (1 point if locally, 0.5 points if foreign [i.e., the country is a colony], 0.75 if in 
between [a local government with substantial foreign oversight]) 
3.) How much of the territory of the modern country was ruled by the government? (1 point if over 50 percent, 0.75 points if 
between 25 percent and 50 percent, 0.5 points if between 10 and 25 percent, 0.3 points if less than 10 percent)  
Answers were extracted from the historical accounts on each of the countries in the Encyclopedia Britannica. 
For a given fifty year period, what is today a country has a score of 50 if it is an autonomous nation, 0 if it had no govern ment above 
the tribal level, 25 if the entire territory was ruled by another country, and so on. 
To combine the data of the 39 periods, the authors tried alternative rates for discounting the influence of the past, ranging from 0 to a 
discount of 50 percent for each half century. 
In their analysis, the authors mainly focus on the variable statehist05, which has a discount rate of 5 percent. For that reason, we are 
using the same variable. 
Scale is 0-1. Higher values are associated with more depth of experience with state-level institutions. 
Source: Bockstette, Chanda and Putterman (2002) 
http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/louis_putterman/antiquity%20index.htm  
 
 
 
Logarithm of Discounted Sum of Years of Ancient Statehood, 1 AD to 1950 AD. 
Source: Putterman (2007) 
 
Dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the post-colonial state is embedded into precolonial relations of authority.  
Dummy = 1 for Botswana, Burundi, Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Mauritius, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Swaziland.  
Source: Englebert (2000)  
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Fractal 
 
 
Partitioned 
 
 
 
Communist Legacy 
 
 
 
 
Executive Constraints 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Internal Conflict 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
External Conflict 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fractal dimension of the country's political (non-coastline) borders. 
Source: Alesina, Easterly and Matuszeski (2011) 
 
Percentage of a county's population that belongs to a partitioned group. A partitioned group is defined as a group that is present in two 
bordering countries.    
Source: Alesina, Easterly and Matuszeski (2011)  
 
Dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if a country has been under communist rule. 
The following countries were under communist rule. Angola: 1975-1992; Benin 1975-1990; Congo Republic 1970-1992; Eritrea 1993-
today; Ethiopia 1974-1991; Mozambique 1975-1990; Somalia 1976-1991. 
Source: Constructed by the authors. 
 
a) Constraints on the executive in the first year of independence (i.e. the first year a country enters the data set)  .  
b) Mean constraints on the executive between first year of independence and 2013 .   
c) Mean constraints on the executive between 1961 and 2013.    
This variable refers to the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision making powers of chief executives, whether individuals 
or collectivities. Such limitations may be imposed by any "accountability groups." In Western democracies these are usually legislatures. 
Other kinds of accountability groups are the ruling party in a one-party state, councils of nobles or powerful advisors in monarchies, the 
military in coup-prone polities, and in many states a strong, independent judiciary. The concern is therefore with the checks and 
balances between the various parts of the decision-making process.  
Scale is 1-7. A high value equates to high constraints on the executive concomitant with effective checks and balances systems. 
Source: Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr (2014). Center for Systemic Peace. Polity IV Project, Political Regime Characteristics and 
Transitions, 1800-2013. http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html 
 
This is an assessment of political violence in the country and its actual or potential impact on governance. To avoid awkward ness in 
interpreting the coefficients, we recoded the measure so that a high number reflects a higher degree of internal conflict. The lowest 
rating is given to those countries where there is no armed or civil opposition to the government and the government does not indulge in 
arbitrary violence, direct or opposition to the government and the government does not indulge in arbitrary violence, direct or indirect, 
against its own people. The highest rating is given to a country embroiled in an on-going civil war.  
Scale is 0-12.    
Source: ICRG Index from PRS Group    
   
The external conflict measure is an assessment both of the risk to the incumbent government from foreign action, ranging from non-
violent external pressure (diplomatic pressures, withholding of aid, trade restrictions, territorial disputes, sanctions, etc.) to violent 
external pressure (cross-border conflicts to all-out war). To avoid awkwardness in interpreting the coefficients, we recoded the measure 
so that a high number reflects a higher degree of external conflict. A low score equates to a very low risk and a high score equates to a 
very high risk.    
Scale is 0-12.    
Source: ICRG Index from PRS Group  
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Domestic Violence 
 
 
 
 
External Violence 
 
 
 
 
Economic determinants 
 
GDP per capita 
 
 
 
 
Gross Public Revenue 
 per capita 
 
Legal determinants 
 
Legal Origin 
 
 
 
 
Cultural determinants 
 
Ethnolinguistic 
 Fractionalization 
 
 
 
Polarization Index 
 
 
 
 
Intensity of Total Internal Conflict (civil, ethnic violence and war) involving the state in that year. Scale is 0-10.  
Source: Marshall (2014). Center for Systemic Peace. Major Episodes of Political Violence, 1946-2013 (War List)   
http://www.systemicpeace.org/warlist.html    
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html 
   
Intensity of Total External Conflict (interstate violence and war) involving thestate in that year. Scale is 0-10.  
Source: Marshall (2014). Center for Systemic Peace. Major Episodes of Political Violence, 1946-2013 (War List)    
http://www.systemicpeace.org/warlist.html    
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html 
 
 
 
Gross Domestic Product per capita in current and constant (2005) dollars. 
Sources: Maddison (2010). Statistics on World Population, GDP and Per Capita GDP, 1-2008 AD. Groningen Growth and 
Development Center (GGDC), University of Groningen, The Netherlands: http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/oriindex.htm ; World 
Development Indicators, World Bank. 
 
Gross public revenue per capita in 1925 or 1929. Measured in 1911 British pounds.  
Source: Frankema and van Waijenburg (2014) 
 
 
 
Identifies the legal origin of the company law or commercial code of each country. There are originally five possible origins: (1) English 
Common Law, (2) French Commercial Code, (3) Socialist/Communist Laws, (4) German Commercial Code and (5) Scandinavian 
Commercial Code. Legal systems in Africa either belong to the English common law or the French civil law family. Dummy variable 
that takes on the value of 1 for countries with English legal origin, 0 for countries with French legal origin.  
Source: La Porta et al. (1999) 
 
 
Measures the probability that two randomly selected people from a given country will not belong to the same ethnolinguistic group . 
Scale is 0-1. A higher index is associated with a higher probability. 
Source: Easterly and Levine (1997) 
 
Measures the degree to which several ethnic groups are dominant in a country. Levels of ethnic polarization vary with the size of rival 
ethnic groups. A higher index is associated with a higher polarization (e.g. two rivalling ethnic groups have more or less the same size). 
A lower index is associated with a lower polarization (e.g. the disparity in size between the majority and minority ethnic group is large). 
Source: Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) 
 
46 
 
Ethnic Tensions 
 
 
 
 
 
Religion Shares 
 
 
 
Geographical determinants 
 
Oil Production Dummy 
 
 
 
 
Oil production 
 
 
 
Gold production 
 
 
 
Diamond production 
 
 
 
 
TseTse Suitability Index (TSI) 
 
 
 
 
 
Latitude 
 
 
This component is an assessment of the degree of tension within a country attributable to racial, nationality, or language divisions. To 
avoid awkwardness in interpreting the coefficients, we recoded the measure so that a high number reflects a higher degree of ethnic 
tensions. Higher ratings are given to countries where racial and nationality tensions are high because opposing groups are in tolerant or 
unwilling to compromise. Lower ratings are given to countries where tensions are minimal.  Scale is 0-6. 
Source: ICRG Index from PRS Group 
 
Identifies the percentage of the population of each country that belonged to the three most widely spread religions in the wo rld in 1980. 
The numbers are in percent (scale from 0 to 100). The three religions identified are Roman Catholic, Protestant, and Muslim. The 
residual is called "other religions".    
Source: La Porta et al. (1999) 
 
 
Indicator ranges between 0 and 1. Equal to 1 if country was oil producer in each year in the period studied. Equal to 0 if co untry has 
never been an oil producer in each year in the period studied     
Own calculations based on: US Energy Information Administration (EIA) Agency (2014); Ross (2013-02), "Oil and Gas Data, 1932-
2011". http://thedata.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/mlross/faces/study/StudyPage.xhtm l?globalId=hdl:1902.1/20369 
 
Average annual oil production per thousand inhabitants from 1970 to 2000. Crude petroleum is measured in thousands of carats.   
Source: Nunn (2008) using British Geological Survey's World Mineral Statistics and World Mineral Production   
http://scholar.harvard.edu/nunn/pages/data-0  
 
Average annual gold production per thousand inhabitants from 1970 to 2000. Mined gold is measured in kilograms.   
Source: Nunn (2008) using British Geological Survey's World Mineral Statistics and World Mineral Production   
http://scholar.harvard.edu/nunn/pages/data-0  
 
Average annual diamond production per thousand inhabitants from 1970 to 2000. Diamonds include both gemstones and industrial 
diamonds and are measured in thousands of carats.    
Source: Nunn (2008) using British Geological Survey's World Mineral Statistics and World Mineral Production   
http://scholar.harvard.edu/nunn/pages/data-0 
 
The TseTse suitability index (TSI) is a measure for the potential prevalence of the TseTse fly in a region. Using the potential rather than 
the observed prevalence as index purges the estimates of bias arising from states with stronger institutions being better able to control the 
fly. A high index corresponds to a highly TseTse suitable area. A low index corresponds to a less TseTse suitable area within Africa. The 
index is created using insect physiology and demographic modeling    
Source: Alsan (2015) 
 
Latitude of country centroid. In those countries where the country centroid fell in the ocean, it was moved to within the nearest land 
boundary.    
Source: Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger (1999) 
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Climate zone A 
 
 
Climate zone B 
 
 
Distance 
 
 
% Mountainous Terrain 
 
 
Demographic determinants 
 
Population 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Population Density 
 
 
 
 
 
 
% of European descent 
 
Percent of cultivated land in Koppen–Geiger climate zone A (humid climate with no winter).    
Source: Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger (1999) 
 
Percent of cultivated land in Koppen–Geiger climate zone B (dry climate with no winter).    
Source: Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger (1999) 
 
Mean distance to nearest coastline or sea-navigable river (km).    
Source: Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger (1999) 
 
Proportion of the country that is mountainous terrain.  
Source: Fearon and Laitin (2003) 
 
 
 
Total population is based on the de facto definition of population which counts all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship. 
Refugees not permanently settled in the country of asylum are generally considered to be part of the population of their coun try of 
origin. 
Source: Maddison (2010). Statistics on World Population, GDP and Per Capita GDP, 1-2008 AD. Groningen Growth and 
Development Center (GGDC), University of Groningen, The Netherlands: http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/oriindex.htm; World 
Development Indicators, World Bank. 
 
 
Total population in 1400 (1960) divided by land area in square kilometers. Total population is based on the de facto definition of 
population which counts all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship. Refugees not permanently settled in the country of asylum 
are generally considered to be part of the population of their country of origin. Land area is a country's total area, exclud ing area under 
inland water bodies. In most cases the definition of inland water bodies includes major rivers and lakes. 
Source: Data for 1400 comes from Parker (1997). Data for 1960 comes from World Bank World Development Indicators (2014).
    
 
Measure of European settlements. Data on the percent of European descent are available for the years 1900 and 1975. 
Scale is 0-100    
Source: Published in Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson (2001) based on McEvedy and Jones (1975) and Curtin, Feierman, Thompson 
and Vansina (1995). 
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APPENDIX 2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Table A2.1: Summary statistics for the static analysis  
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Dependent variables 
Bureaucratic Quality in 2014 
 
37 
 
1.30 
 
0.77 
 
0 
 
2.50 
Bureaucratic Quality, 1984-2014  37 1.39 0.71 0 2.83 
Bureaucratic Quality, 1996-2014  37 1.27 0.72 0 2.31 
      
Main explanatory variables 
Precolonial Political Centralization 
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0.59 
 
0.33 
 
0 
 
1 
Aid as % of GDP, 1961-2013 53 14.45 9.73 0.12 41.46 
      
Main Controls      
Log GDP/capita, 1961-2013  53 6.60 1.01 5.06 9.14 
External War Threat, 1961-2013  51 0.05 0.13 0 0.75 
Domestic Violence, 1961-2013 51 0.70 1.15 0 5.05 
Oil Production Dummy, 1961-2013 53 0.26 0.39 0 1 
Legal Origin 53 0.34 0.48 0 1 
Log Population density, 1400 52 0.11 1.33 -2.30 3.04 
Partitioned Dimension 41 48 30.67 0 100 
      
Additional Controls      
Log Fractal Dimension 45 0.03 0.01 0 0.07 
Log Slave Exports, normalized by area 52 3.26 3.89 -2.30 8.82 
Log Slave Exports, normalized by population 52 9.26 3.68 3.91 14.40 
State Antiquity 46 0.33 0.23 0.03 0.96 
Log Years of Ancient Statehood 46 5.37 0.88 3.22 6.76 
Communist Legacy 53 0.13 0.34 0 1 
Gross Public Revenue per capita, 1925 27 0.36 0.45 0.04 2.26 
Vertical Legitimacy 48 0.21 0.41 0 1 
Executive constraints, in Independence Year 51 3.49 2.13 1 7 
Executive constraints, 1961-2013 51 3.04 1.31 1.32 7 
Independence Years (until 2014) 53 55.25 24.95 21 167 
Average Diamond Production per capita, 1970-2000 52 -5.49 2.40 -6.91 2.19 
Average Gold Production per capita, 1970-2000 52 -7.48 5.66 -13.82 3.08 
Average Oil Production per capita, 1970-2000 52 -6.71 4.03 -9.21 3.24 
% of European descent, 1900 50 3.27 14.23 0 1 
% Catholics 53 27.64 30.09 0 96.60 
% Protestants 53 11.02 13.67 0 64.20 
% Muslims 53 33.03 36.93 0 99.80 
% Other Religions 53 28.32 21.38 0.20 64.10 
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization 42 0.62 0.27 0.04 0.93 
Ethnic Polarization Index 46 0.53 0.20 0.02 0.90 
Log GDP per capita 1960s (constant) 30 6.40 0.85 4.98 8.29 
Log GDP per capita 1970s (constant) 48 6.61 0.93 5.22 9.30 
Log GDP per capita 1980s (constant) 52 6.59 0.99 5.01 9.09 
Log GDP per capita 1990s (constant) 53 6.54 1.08 4.63 9.20 
Log GDP per capita 2000s (constant) 53 6.70 1.15 5.00 9.35 
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Table A2.2: Summary statistics for the dynamic analysis 
Period 1984-2014 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent variable      
∆ Bureaucratic Quality, 1984-2014  36 0.03 1.29 -3 2.50 
Explanatory variables      
Precolonial Centralization 47 0.59 0.33 0 1 
Aid as % of GDP, 1984-2013 51 7.18 5.83 0 24.02 
Initial Bureaucratic Quality, 1984 35 1.04 1.07 0 4 
∆ Relative GDP per capita, 1984-2013 51 0.79 3.81 -0.52 27.05 
Ethnic Tension, 1984-2013 36 2.80 0.98 1.00 5.18 
Internal Conflict, 1984-2013 36 4.40 1.51 1.21 8.64 
External Conflict, 1984-2013 36 3.13 1.25 1.34 6.62 
Domestic Violence, 1984-2013 49 0.81 1.71 0 5.73 
External Violence, 1984-2013 49 0.34 0.58 0 4.03 
Oil Production Dummy, 1984-2013 51 0.32 0.44 0 1 
 
Period 1984-1995 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent variable      
∆ Bureaucratic Quality, 1984-1995  36 0.25 1.03 -2 3 
Explanatory variables      
Precolonial Centralization 47 0.59 0.33 0 1 
Aid as % of GDP, 1984-1995 51 9.19 7.93 0 35.57 
Initial Bureaucratic Quality, 1984 36 1.29 1.10 0 4.00 
∆ Relative GDP per capita, 1984-1995 51 -0.01 0.32 -0.90 0.78 
Ethnic Tension, 1984-1995 36 3.03 0.98 0.99 5.53 
Internal Conflict, 1984-1995 36 5.52 2.06 1.73 10.15 
External Conflict, 1984-1995 36 3.98 1.48 1.67 6.38 
Domestic Violence, 1984-1995 49 1.00 1.66 0 7.00 
External Violence, 1984-1995 49 0.01 0.03 0 0.17 
Oil Production Dummy, 1984-1995 51 0.28 0.44 0 1 
 
Period 1996-2014 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent variable      
∆ Bureaucratic Quality, 1996-2014 37 -0.31 0.93 -3 1.50 
Explanatory variables      
Precolonial Centralization 48 0.59 0.33 0 1 
Aid as % of GDP, 1996-2013 53 5.94 5.37 0.10 27.97 
Initial Bureaucratic Quality, 1996 37 1.64 1 0 3.50 
∆ Relative GDP per capita, 1996-2013 51 -0.01 0.32 -0.90 0.78 
Ethnic Tension, 1996-2013 37 2.61 1.11 0.40 5.12 
Internal Conflict, 1996-2013 37 3.71 1.44 0.89 7.98 
External Conflict, 1996-2013 37 2.38 1.37 0.12 6.91 
Domestic Violence, 1996-2013 51 0.67 1.33 0 5.56 
External Violence, 1996-2013 51 0.06 0.20 0 0.83 
Oil Production Dummy, 1996-2013 53 0.34 0.46 0 1 
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Table A2.3: TseTse Suitability Index in Africa at the national level 
 
Country 
 
TSI 
 
Country 
 
TSI 
Equatorial Guinea 
 
1.475 
 
Namibia 
 
-0.329 
Gabon 
 
1.403 
 
Algeria 
 
-0.345 
Liberia 
 
1.123 
 
Sudan 
 
-0.352 
Congo Republic 
 
1.015 
 
Guinea-Bissau 
 
-0.378 
Cameroon 
 
0.986 
 
Burkina Faso 
 
-0.390 
Cote d'Ivoire 
 
0.978 
 
Malawi 
 
-0.420 
Sierra Leone 
 
0.850 
 
Kenya 
 
-0.430 
Central African Republic 
 
0.815 
 
Zambia 
 
-0.434 
Mozambique 
 
0.807 
 
Eritrea 
 
-0.482 
Benin 
 
0.754 
 
Tanzania 
 
-0.530 
Democratic Republic of Congo 0.725 
 
Niger 
 
-0.692 
Togo 
 
0.601 
 
Burundi 
 
-0.729 
Ghana 
 
0.541 
 
Mauritania 
 
-0.822 
Guinea 
 
0.526 
 
Rwanda 
 
-0.875 
Somalia 
 
0.489 
 
Zimbabwe 
 
-0.956 
Botswana 
 
0.369 
 
Mali 
 
-0.963 
Libya 
 
0.329 
 
Senegal 
 
-0.994 
Nigeria 
 
0.285 
 
Ethiopia 
 
-1.021 
Uganda 
 
0.283 
 
Swaziland 
 
-1.131 
Angola 
 
0.278 
 
Morocco 
 
-1.205 
Egypt 
 
0.050 
 
Tunisia 
 
-1.265 
Chad 
 
-0.244 
 
South Africa 
 
-2.708 
Notes: The TseTse Suitability Index has originally been constructed for African ethnic groups at the 
regional level (Alsan, 2015). African ethnic groups from Cape Verde, Comoros, Djibouti, Gambia, 
Lesotho, Madagascar, Mauritius, Sao Tomé and Principe and Seychelles were not included in the analysis.  
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APPENDIX 3: ADDITIONAL ESTIMATION TABLES 
Table A3.1: Aid Dependence and Change in Bureaucratic Quality controlling for initial conditions, 1984-2014, OLS estimates 
Dependent Variable: OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
∆ Bureaucratic Quality, 1984-2014 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Initial Bureaucratic Quality -1.03*** -0.98*** -1.05*** -1.16*** -1.00*** 
 (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.16) (0.13) 
      
Mean Aid Dependence, 1984-2013 -6.00** -4.68* -4.79** -5.92** -5.53** 
 (2.48) (2.53) (2.31) (2.29) (2.55) 
      
Mean Aid Dependence, 1984-2013 0.42 -0.40 -0.15 1.24 -0.29 
  x Initial Bureaucratic Quality (1.68) (1.62) (1.77) (1.76) (1.57) 
      
∆ Relative GDP per capita, 1984-2013  0.31* 0.15 0.28 0.33** 
  (0.17) (0.16) (0.17) (0.15) 
      
Mean Ethnic Tensions, 1984-2013   -0.27**   
    (0.12)   
      
Mean Domestic Violence, 1984-2013    -0.15**  
    (0.07)  
      
Mean External Violence, 1984-2013    0.22*  
     (0.11)  
      
Oil Production Dummy, 1984-2013     -0.57 
     (0.47) 
      
Constant 1.72*** 1.49*** 2.40*** 1.81*** 1.61*** 
 (0.27) (0.29) (0.44) (0.30) (0.32) 
Observations 36 36 36 36 36 
R2 0.70 0.73 0.76 0.76 0.73 
adj. R2 0.67 0.69 0.72 0.71 0.69 
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, *at the 10% 
level. 
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Table A3.2: Aid Dependence and Change in Bureaucratic Quality controlling for initial conditions, 1984-1995, OLS estimates 
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
∆ Bureaucratic Quality, 1984-1995 OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
      
Initial Bureaucratic Quality -0.63*** -0.63*** -0.63*** -0.64*** -0.61*** 
 (0.14) (0.15) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) 
      
Mean Aid Dependence, 1984-1995 -4.95* -4.28 -4.30 -4.40 -2.40 
 (2.78) (2.58) (2.60) (2.86) (3.03) 
      
Mean Aid Dependence, 1984-1995 0.52 -0.17 -0.16 -0.02 -0.69 
  x Initial Bureaucratic Quality (2.43) (2.30) (2.32) (2.67) (2.33) 
      
∆ Relative GDP per capita, 1984-1995  0.81 0.83 0.77 0.98* 
  (0.52) (0.62) (0.55) (0.49) 
      
Mean Ethnic Tensions, 1984-1995   0.01   
    (0.14)   
      
Mean Domestic Violence, 1984-1995    -0.05  
    (0.05)  
      
Mean External Violence, 1984-1995    1.21  
     (1.55)  
      
Oil Production Dummy, 1984-1995     0.44 
     (0.33) 
      
Constant 1.40*** 1.47*** 1.44** 1.53*** 1.20*** 
 (0.27) (0.27) (0.54) (0.30) (0.38) 
Observations 36 36 36 36 36 
R2 0.47 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.54 
adj. R2 0.41 0.44 0.43 0.41 0.46 
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, *at the 10% 
level. 
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Table A3.3: Precolonial Centralization and State Capacity in 2014, additional controls, OLS estimates 
Dependent Variable: 
Bureaucratic Quality, 2014 
OLS 
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
OLS 
(3) 
OLS 
(4) 
OLS 
(5) 
OLS 
(6) 
OLS 
(7) 
OLS 
(8) 
         
Precolonial Centralization 1.19*** 1.40*** 1.43*** 1.21** 1.37*** 1.31*** 1.28*** 1.25*** 
 (0.42) (0.34) (0.32) (0.44) (0.42) (0.35) (0.34) (0.35) 
         
Slave Exports (area) -0.03        
 (0.04)        
         
State Antiquity  -0.09       
  (0.44)       
         
Years of Ancient State History   -0.04      
    (0.16)      
         
Vertical Legitimacy    0.11     
    (0.26)     
         
Fractal Dimension     -1.90    
     (10.53)    
         
Mean Gold Production      0.00   
 per capita, 1970-2000      (0.03)   
         
Mean Oil Production      0.01   
 per capita, 1970-2000      (0.03)   
         
Mean Diamond Production      0.01   
 per capita, 1970-2000      (0.05)   
         
Executive Constraints in        -0.02  
 Independence Year       (0.05)  
         
Mean Executive Constraints,        0.10 
 1961-2013        (0.08) 
         
Constant 0.76* 0.52* 0.72 0.58** 0.58 0.65 0.64* 0.27 
 (0.38) (0.30) (0.93) (0.26) (0.50) (0.43) (0.36) (0.34) 
Observations 37 34 34 32 34 37 37 37 
Geography Controls No No No No No No No No 
R2 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.23 0.34 0.30 0.30 0.32 
adj. R2 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.17 0.29 0.21 0.26 0.28 
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at the 10% level. The variables Slave Exports, Years 
of  Ancient State History , Fractal Dimension, Gold Production, Oil Production and Diamond Production are log transformed. 
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Dependent Variable: 
Bureaucratic Quality, 2014 
(9) 
OLS 
(10) 
OLS 
(11) 
OLS 
(12) 
OLS 
(13) 
OLS 
(14) 
OLS 
(15) 
OLS 
(16) 
OLS 
         
Precolonial Centralization 1.31*** 1.24* 0.89* 1.32*** 1.36*** 1.39*** 1.30*** 1.21*** 
 (0.32) (0.61) (0.45) (0.31) (0.40) (0.36) (0.34) (0.34) 
         
Years of Independence -0.00*        
 (0.00)        
         
Gross public revenue  -0.34       
 per capita, 1925  (0.48)       
         
Mean GDP per capita, 1970s   -0.28      
 (constant 2005 USD)   (0.41)      
         
Mean GDP per capita, 1980s   -0.53      
 (constant 2005 USD)   (0.64)      
         
Mean GDP per capita, 1990s   0.34      
 (constant 2005 USD)   (0.43)      
         
Mean GDP per capita, 2000s   0.50      
 (constant 2005 USD)   (0.45)      
         
Communist Legacy    -0.37**     
    (0.18)     
         
European Descent in 1900     -0.04    
     (0.04)    
         
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization      -0.03   
      (0.36)   
         
Polarization Index       0.36  
       (0.47)  
         
Catholic        0.00 
        (0.01) 
         
Protestant        0.01 
        (0.01) 
         
Muslim        0.00 
        (0.00) 
         
Constant 0.74** 0.78* 0.58 0.60** 0.60** 0.51 0.36 0.22 
 (0.29) (0.37) (0.76) (0.25) (0.27) (0.36) (0.35) (0.42) 
Observations 37 22 34 37 35 34 34 37 
Geography Controls No No No No No No No No 
R2 0.31 0.21 0.45 0.32 0.26 0.32 0.30 0.32 
adj. R2 0.27 0.12 0.36 0.28 0.21 0.27 0.26 0.24 
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The variable Mean GDP per capita is log 
transformed. 
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Table A3.4: Precolonial Centralization and State Capacity in 2014, additional controls (including geography), OLS estimates  
Dependent Variable: 
Bureaucratic Quality, 2014 
OLS 
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
OLS 
(3) 
OLS 
(4) 
OLS 
(5) 
OLS 
(6) 
OLS 
(7) 
OLS 
(8) 
         
Precolonial Centralization 1.23** 1.53*** 1.50** 1.26 1.35** 1.32** 1.29** 1.23** 
 (0.56) (0.53) (0.55) (0.76) (0.58) (0.59) (0.53) (0.52) 
         
Slave Exports (area) -0.04        
 (0.04)        
         
State Antiquity  -0.73       
  (0.97)       
         
Years of Ancient State History   -0.10      
    (0.25)      
         
Vertical Legitimacy    0.12     
    (0.42)     
         
Fractal Dimension     -0.80    
     (13.18)    
         
Mean Gold Production      0.02   
      (0.03)   
         
Mean Oil Production      0.01   
      (0.03)   
         
Mean Diamond Production      0.01   
      (0.06)   
         
Executive Constraints in        -0.01  
 Independence Year       (0.07)  
         
Mean Executive Constraints,        0.23 
 1961-2013        (0.16) 
         
Constant 0.88 0.54 0.91 0.69 0.66 0.97 0.72 -0.00 
 (0.74) (0.74) (1.22) (0.84) (0.92) (0.91) (0.71) (0.91) 
Observations 37 34 34 32 34 37 37 37 
Geography Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.34 0.38 0.37 0.26 0.39 0.34 0.33 0.39 
adj. R2 0.19 0.21 0.20 0.04 0.22 0.12 0.17 0.24 
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10% level. The variables Slave Exports 
and Years of  Ancient State History, Fractal Dimension, Gold Production, Oil Production and Diamond Production are log transformed. Geography controls are Latitude, Log 
Mountainous Terrain, % of  cultivated land in Köppen–Geiger climate zone A (humid climate with no winter) and climate zone B (dry climate with no winter) and Mean distance to 
nearest coastline or sea-navigable river (km). 
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Dependent Variable: 
Bureaucratic Quality, 2014 
OLS 
(9) 
OLS 
(10) 
OLS 
(11) 
OLS 
(12) 
OLS 
(13) 
OLS 
(14) 
OLS 
(15) 
OLS 
(16) 
         
Precolonial Centralization 1.28** 1.28 0.85 1.32** 1.11* 1.38** 1.34** 1.28** 
 (0.54) (1.09) (0.57) (0.49) (0.62) (0.55) (0.56) (0.52) 
         
Years of Independence -0.00**        
 (0.00)        
         
Gross public revenue  0.01       
 per capita, 1925  (1.00)       
         
Mean GDP per capita, 1970s   -0.41      
 (constant 2005 USD)   (0.43)      
         
Mean GDP per capita, 1980s   -0.55      
 (constant 2005 USD)   (0.65)      
         
Mean GDP per capita, 1990s   0.39      
 (constant 2005 USD)   (0.46)      
         
Mean GDP per capita, 2000s   0.60      
 (constant 2005 USD)   (0.48)      
         
Communist Legacy    -0.48**     
    (0.23)     
         
European Descent in 1900     -0.04    
     (0.04)    
         
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization      0.26   
      (0.54)   
         
Polarization Index       0.44  
       (0.49)  
         
Catholic        0.00 
        (0.01) 
         
Protestant        0.02 
        (0.01) 
         
Muslim        0.00 
        (0.01) 
         
Constant 1.01 0.59 1.01 0.71 1.00 0.52 0.45 0.34 
 (0.72) (0.99) (0.94) (0.68) (0.73) (0.79) (0.78) (0.93) 
Observations 37 22 34 37 35 34 34 37 
Geography Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.36 0.25 0.55 0.37 0.32 0.36 0.35 0.37 
adj. R2 0.20 -0.12 0.35 0.22 0.14 0.18 0.17 0.16 
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at 10% level. The variable Mean GDP per capita is log transformed. 
Geography controls are Latitude, Log Mountainous Terrain, % of cultivated land in Köppen–Geiger climate zone A (humid climate with no winter) and climate zone B (dry climate with no winter) and Mean 
distance to nearest coastline or sea-navigable river (km). 
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Table A3.5: Precolonial Centralization and State Capacity in 1984, OLS estimates 
Dependent Variable: 
Bureaucratic Quality, 1984 
OLS 
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
OLS 
(3) 
OLS 
(4) 
OLS 
(5) 
OLS 
(6) 
OLS 
(7) 
OLS 
(8) 
OLS 
(9) 
OLS 
(10) 
OLS 
(11) 
OLS 
(12) 
             
Precolonial Centralization 0.53 -0.70 0.75 -0.50 0.35 -1.25 0.56 -0.67 0.52 -0.57 0.58 -0.61 
 (0.79) (0.77) (0.92) (0.92) (0.78) (1.14) (0.80) (0.60) (0.79) (0.81) (0.79) (0.90) 
             
British   0.38 0.74         
   (0.67) (0.83)         
             
French   1.17 1.84**         
   (0.69) (0.75)         
             
Belgian   -0.49 1.77         
   (0.60) (1.08)         
             
Portuguese   1.52** 1.25         
   (0.59) (0.88)         
             
Mean GDP per Capita, 61-84     0.75* 0.39       
      (0.38) (0.36)       
             
Mean Aid Dependence, 61-84     0.28 -2.65       
      (2.08) (3.20)       
             
Mean Domestic Violence, 61-84     0.02 0.03       
      (0.13) (0.11)       
             
Mean External Violence, 61-84     0.65 0.73       
      (1.04) (1.62)       
             
Oil Production Dummy, 61-84     -0.75 -0.54       
      (0.79) (0.89)       
             
Legal Origin       -0.52 -1.10***     
       (0.46) (0.33)     
             
Population Density in 1400         -0.20 -0.14   
         (0.28) (0.23)   
             
Partitioned 
 
          -0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.01) 
             
Constant 0.82 3.06** 0.00 1.51 -3.93 1.75 1.03 3.50*** 0.93* 2.95** 0.93 2.93* 
 (0.54) (1.25) (0.00) (0.95) (2.46) (3.60) (0.62) (1.04) (0.54) (1.29) (0.61) (1.42) 
Observations 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 23 23 
Geography controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
R2 0.02 0.50 0.21 0.72 0.27 0.65 0.08 0.66 0.05 0.51 0.03 0.54 
adj. R2 -0.02 0.34 0.00 0.51 0.03 0.35 -0.01 0.52 -0.04 0.31 -0.07 0.32 
Notes: The variables GDP per capita and Population Density are log transformed. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% l evel, *at the 10% level. 
Geography controls are Latitude, Log Mountainous Terrain, % of cultivated land in Köppen–Geiger climate zone A (humid climate with no winter) and climate zone B (dry climate with no winter) and Mean distance to nearest coastline or 
sea-navigable river (km). 
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Table A3.6: Precolonial Centralization and Average State Capacity 1996-2014, main controls, OLS estimates 
Dependent Variable: 
Bureaucratic Quality, 1996-2014 
OLS 
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
OLS 
(3) 
OLS 
(4) 
OLS 
(5) 
OLS 
(6) 
OLS 
(7) 
OLS 
(8) 
OLS 
(9) 
OLS 
(10) 
OLS 
(11) 
OLS 
(12) 
             
Precolonial Centralization 1.17*** 1.17*** 1.11*** 1.19** 1.06*** 1.09 1.19*** 1.25** 1.16*** 1.16** 1.29*** 1.49** 
  (0.33) (0.54) (0.36) (0.57) (0.38) (0.64) (0.35) (0.54) (0.33) (0.55) (0.35) (0.35) 
             
British   0.68*** 0.85***         
   (0.26) (0.30)         
             
French   0.51** 0.68***         
   (0.20) (0.22)         
             
Belgian   -0.77*** -0.62         
   (0.13) (0.37)         
             
Portuguese   0.38 0.40         
   (0.31) (0.38)         
             
Mean GDP per Capita, 1961-1996     0.15 0.11       
      (0.13) (0.15)       
             
Mean Aid Dependence, 1961-1996     -0.71 -0.57       
      (0.82) (1.01)       
             
Mean Domestic Violence, 1961-1996     -0.07 -0.09       
      (0.05) (0.07)       
             
Mean External Violence, 1961-1996     0.49 0.18       
      (0.74) (1.23)       
             
Oil Production Dummy, 1961-1996     -0.26 -0.31       
      (0.26) (1.19)       
             
Legal Origin       0.27 0.32     
       (0.20) (0.25)     
             
Population Density in 1400         0.03 0.02   
         (0.11) (0.16)   
             
Partitioned           0.00 0.00 
           (0.00) (0.00) 
             
Constant 0.61** 0.82 0.13 0.01 -0.08 0.22 0.48* 0.61 0.59** 0.82 0.50 0.05 
 (0.24) (0.63) (0.18) (0.59) (0.86) (1.48) (0.26) (0.67) (0.26) (0.64) (0.34) (0.68) 
Observations 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 32 32 
Geography controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
R2 0.27 0.31 0.41 0.46 0.33 0.37 0.30 0.35 0.27 0.31 0.34 0.43 
adj. R2 0.25 0.17 0.31 0.25 0.20 0.09 0.26 0.19 0.23 0.14 0.29 0.26 
Notes: The variables GDP per capita and Population Density are log transformed. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, 
*at the 10% level. Geography controls are Latitude, Log Mountainous Terrain, % of cultivated land in Köppen–Geiger climate zone A (humid climate with no winter) and climate zone B (dry climate with no 
winter) and Mean distance to nearest coastline or sea-navigable river (km). 
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Table A3.7: Precolonial Centralization and Average State Capacity 1996-2014, additional controls, OLS estimates 
Dependent Variable: 
Mean Bureaucratic Quality, 1996-2014 
OLS 
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
OLS 
(3) 
OLS 
(4) 
OLS 
(5) 
OLS 
(6) 
OLS 
(7) 
OLS 
(8) 
         
Precolonial Centralization 0.96** 0.92** 1.28*** 1.32*** 1.11** 1.28*** 1.16*** 1.09*** 
 (0.41) (0.40) (0.32) (0.30) (0.43) (0.41) (0.33) (0.35) 
         
Slave Exports (area) -0.05        
 (0.03)        
         
Slave Exports (population)  -0.07*       
  (0.03)       
         
State Antiquity   -0.30      
   (0.44)      
         
Years of Ancient    -0.11     
 State History    (0.16)     
         
Vertical Legitimacy     0.01    
     (0.34)    
         
Fractal Dimension      0.62   
      (9.94)   
         
Executive Constraints       -0.01  
 in Independence Year       (0.05)  
         
Mean Executive Constraints,        0.12 
 1961-1996        (0.07) 
         
Constant 0.95** 1.46*** 0.64** 1.11 0.63** 0.54 0.65* 0.33 
 (0.37) (0.53) (0.30) (0.91) (0.26) (0.49) (0.33) (0.30) 
Observations 37 37 34 34 32 34 37 37 
Geography Controls No No No No No No No No 
R2 0.31 0.33 0.29 0.30 0.21 0.32 0.27 0.31 
adj. R2 0.27 0.29 0.24 0.25 0.15 0.27 0.22 0.27 
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10% level. The variables Slave 
Exports, Years of  Ancient State History, Fractal Dimension and GDP per capita are log transformed. 
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Dependent Variable: 
Mean Bureaucratic Quality, 1996-2014 
OLS 
(9) 
OLS 
(10) 
OLS 
(11) 
OLS 
(12) 
OLS 
(13) 
OLS 
(14) 
OLS 
(15) 
OLS 
(16) 
         
Precolonial Centralization 1.17*** 0.92 1.10*** 1.18*** 1.19*** 1.25*** 1.20*** 1.07*** 
 (0.32) (0.58) (0.38) (0.31) (0.38) (0.37) (0.34) (0.35) 
         
Years of Independence -0.00**        
 (0.00)        
         
Gross public revenue  -0.22       
 per capita, 1925  (0.46)       
         
Mean GDP per capita, 1970s   -0.77**      
 (constant 2005 USD)   (0.36)      
         
Mean GDP per capita, 1980s   0.78**      
 (constant 2005 USD)   (0.37)      
         
         
Communist Legacy    -0.48***     
    (0.17)     
         
European Descent in 1900     -0.00    
     (0.02)    
         
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization      -0.05   
      (0.37)   
         
Polarization Index       0.22  
       (0.46)  
         
Catholic        0.00 
        (0.01) 
         
Protestant        0.01 
        (0.01) 
         
Muslim        0.00 
        (0.00) 
         
Constant 0.77*** 0.88** 0.62 0.67*** 0.60** 0.59 0.47 0.32 
 (0.27) (0.35) (0.80) (0.24) (0.25) (0.39) (0.34) (0.39) 
Observations 37 22 34 37 37 34 34 37 
Geography Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.29 0.14 0.37 0.32 0.27 0.30 0.29 0.30 
adj. R2 0.25 0.05 0.31 0.28 0.22 0.25 0.24 0.22 
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The variable Mean 
GDP per capita is log transformed. 
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Table A3.8: Precolonial Centralization and Average State Capacity 1996-2014, additional and geography controls, OLS estimates 
Dependent Variable: 
Mean Bureaucratic Quality, 1996-2014 
OLS 
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
OLS 
(3) 
OLS 
(4) 
OLS 
(5) 
OLS 
(6) 
OLS 
(7) 
OLS 
(8) 
         
Precolonial Centralization 1.05* 0.99* 1.40** 1.40** 1.07 1.26** 1.17** 0.99* 
 (0.56) (0.57) (0.52) (0.53) (0.74) (0.58) (0.54) (0.57) 
         
Slave Exports (area) -0.06        
 (0.04)        
         
Slave Exports (population)  -0.08*       
  (0.04)       
         
State Antiquity   -0.88      
   (0.97)      
         
Years of Ancient State History    -0.15     
    (0.24)     
         
Vertical Legitimacy     0.04    
     (0.35)    
         
Fractal Dimension      -0.29   
      (12.41)   
         
Executive Constraints       -0.00  
 in Independence Year       (0.06)  
         
Mean Executive Constraints,        0.20 
 1961-1996        (0.13) 
         
Constant 1.12 1.70** 0.75 1.31 0.66 0.74 0.83 0.53 
 (0.68) (0.83) (0.67) (1.21) (0.74) (0.91) (0.63) (0.69) 
Observations 37 37 34 34 32 34 37 37 
Geography Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.36 0.37 0.35 0.34 0.25 0.39 0.31 0.37 
adj. R2 0.20 0.22 0.17 0.16 0.03 0.22 0.14 0.21 
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10% level. The variables Slave Exports, 
Years of  Ancient State History, Fractal Dimension and GDP per capita are log transformed. Geography controls are Latitude, Log Mountainous Terrain, % of  cultivated 
land in Köppen–Geiger climate zone A (humid climate with no winter)  and climate zone B (dry climate with no winter) and Mean distance to nearest coastline or sea-navigable river 
(km). 
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Dependent Variable: 
Mean Bureaucratic Quality, 1996-2014 
OLS 
(9) 
OLS 
(10) 
OLS 
(11) 
OLS 
(12) 
OLS 
(13) 
OLS 
(14) 
OLS 
(15) 
OLS 
(16) 
         
Precolonial Centralization 1.15** 0.88 1.14* 1.20** 1.19** 1.26** 1.24** 1.15** 
 (0.55) (1.00) (0.59) (0.48) (0.56) (0.55) (0.57) (0.52) 
         
Years of Independence -0.01**        
 (0.00)        
         
Gross public revenue  0.23       
 per capita, 1925  (0.88)       
         
Mean GDP per capita, 1970s   -0.93**      
 (constant 2005 USD)   (0.41)      
         
Mean GDP per capita, 1980s   0.91**      
 (constant 2005 USD)   (0.44)      
         
Communist Legacy    -0.62**     
    (0.24)     
         
European Descent in 1900     -0.01    
     (0.02)    
         
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization      0.29   
      (0.54)   
         
Polarization Index       0.28  
       (0.49)  
         
Catholic        0.00 
        (0.01) 
         
Protestant        0.02 
        (0.01) 
         
Muslim        -0.00 
        (0.01) 
         
Constant 1.07* 0.55 1.06 0.82 0.85 0.67 0.66 0.49 
 (0.63) (0.86) (0.81) (0.60) (0.65) (0.72) (0.73) (0.84) 
Observations 37 22 34 37 37 34 34 37 
Geography Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.34 0.21 0.45 0.39 0.31 0.34 0.33 0.36 
adj. R2 0.19 -0.19 0.27 0.24 0.14 0.16 0.16 0.14 
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The variable Mean GDP per capita is log 
transformed. Geography controls are Latitude, Log Mountainous Terrain, % of cultivated land in Köppen–Geiger climate zone A (humid climate with no winter)  and climate zone B (dry climate with 
no winter) and Mean distance to nearest coastline or sea-navigable river (km). 
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Table A3.9: Aid Dependence, Precolonial Centralization and Change in Bureaucratic Quality  
controlling for initial conditions, 1984-2014, OLS estimates 
Dependent Variable: OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
∆ Bureaucratic Quality, 1984-2014 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
           
Initial Bureaucratic Quality -1.03*** -1.00*** -0.98*** -0.98*** -1.05*** -1.03*** -1.16*** -1.08*** -1.00*** -0.98*** 
 (0.14) (0.10) (0.13) (0.10) (0.14) (0.10) (0.16) (0.14) (0.13) (0.11) 
           
Precolonial Centralization  1.15***  1.02**  0.91*  0.99**  0.98** 
  (0.39)  (0.44)  (0.45)  (0.45)  (0.47) 
           
Mean Aid Dependence, 1984-2013 -6.00** -2.62 -4.68* -2.32 -4.79** -2.67 -5.92** -2.94 -5.53** -2.81 
 (2.48) (2.35) (2.53) (2.38) (2.31) (2.25) (2.29) (2.33) (2.55) (2.69) 
           
Mean Aid Dependence, 1984-2013 0.42 -0.37 -0.40 -0.71 -0.15 -0.46 1.24 0.13 -0.29 -0.64 
 X Initial Bureaucratic Quality (1.68) (1.09) (1.62) (1.24) (1.77) (1.28) (1.76) (1.47) (1.57) (1.24) 
           
∆ Relative GDP per capita, 1984-2013   0.31* 0.16 0.15 0.05 0.28 0.14 0.33** 0.18 
   (0.17) (0.17) (0.16) (0.15) (0.17) (0.17) (0.15) (0.17) 
           
Mean Ethnic Tensions, 1984-2013     -0.27** -0.23*     
      (0.12) (0.13)     
           
Mean Domestic Violence, 1984-2013       -0.15** -0.15*   
       (0.07) (0.08)   
           
Mean External Violence, 1984-2013       0.22* 0.07   
        (0.11) (0.09)   
           
Oil Production Dummy, 1984-2013         -0.57 -0.26 
         (0.47) (0.45) 
           
Constant 1.72*** 0.86** 1.49*** 0.85** 2.40*** 1.67*** 1.81*** 1.11** 1.61*** 0.93* 
 (0.27) (0.38) (0.29) (0.39) (0.44) (0.57) (0.30) (0.43) (0.32) (0.47) 
Observations 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 
R2 0.70 0.77 0.73 0.77 0.76 0.79 0.76 0.80 0.73 0.77 
adj. R2 0.67 0.74 0.69 0.73 0.72 0.75 0.71 0.75 0.69 0.73 
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, *at the 10% level. 
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Table A3.10: Aid Dependence, Precolonial Centralization and Change in Bureaucratic Quality  
controlling for initial conditions, 1984-1995, OLS estimates 
Dependent Variable: OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
∆ Bureaucratic Quality, 1984-1995 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
           
Initial Bureaucratic Quality -0.63*** -0.62*** -0.63*** -0.63*** -0.63*** -0.63*** -0.64*** -0.64*** -0.61*** -0.62*** 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.18) 
           
Precolonial Centralization  0.23  -0.09  -0.09  -0.04  -0.12 
  (0.58)  (0.60)  (0.61)  (0.61)  (0.57) 
           
Mean Aid Dependence, 1984-1995 -4.95* -4.40 -4.28 -4.45 -4.30 -4.47 -4.40 -4.48 -2.40 -2.61 
 (2.78) (3.10) (2.58) (2.99) (2.60) (2.99) (2.86) (3.21) (3.03) (3.46) 
           
Mean Aid Dependence, 1984-1995 0.52 0.32 -0.17 -0.13 -0.16 -0.12 -0.02 -0.01 -0.69 -0.65 
  x Initial Bureaucratic Quality (2.43) (2.35) (2.30) (2.41) (2.32) (2.42) (2.67) (2.74) (2.33) (2.47) 
           
∆ Relative GDP per capita, 1984-1995   0.81 0.85 0.83 0.87 0.77 0.79 0.98* 1.03* 
   (0.52) (0.57) (0.62) (0.63) (0.55) (0.59) (0.49) (0.54) 
           
Mean Ethnic Tensions, 1984-1995     0.01 0.01     
      (0.14) (0.14)     
           
Mean Domestic Violence, 1984-1995       -0.05 -0.04   
       (0.05) (0.05)   
           
Mean External Violence, 1984-1995       1.21 1.25   
        (1.55) (1.48)   
           
Oil Production Dummy, 1984-1995         0.44 0.44 
         (0.33) (0.33) 
           
Constant 1.40*** 1.24** 1.47*** 1.53** 1.44** 1.51* 1.53*** 1.55** 1.20*** 1.29* 
 (0.27) (0.52) (0.27) (0.57) (0.54) (0.83) (0.30) (0.59) (0.38) (0.64) 
Observations 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 
R2 0.47 0.47 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.54 0.54 
adj. R2 0.41 0.40 0.44 0.43 0.43 0.41 0.41 0.39 0.46 0.44 
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, *at the 10% level. 
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Table A3.11: Precolonial Centralization and State Capacity in 2014, additional controls, 2SLS estimates 
Dependent Variable: 
Bureaucratic Quality, 2014 
2SLS 
(1) 
2SLS 
(2) 
2SLS 
(3) 
2SLS 
(4) 
2SLS 
(5) 
2SLS 
(6) 
2SLS 
(7) 
2SLS 
(8) 
         
Precolonial Centralization 1.61** 1.77*** 1.80*** 1.61** 1.61** 1.80*** 1.70** 1.45** 
 (0.78) (0.67) (0.69) (0.75) (0.68) (0.46) (0.70) (0.58) 
         
Slave Exports (area) -0.02        
 (0.04)        
         
State Antiquity  -0.20       
  (0.49)       
         
Years of Ancient State History   -0.09      
    (0.19)      
         
Vertical Legitimacy    -0.02     
    (0.30)     
         
Fractal Dimension     0.39    
     (9.52)    
         
Mean Gold Production      0.02   
 per capita, 1970-2000      (0.02)   
         
Mean Oil Production      0.01   
 per capita, 1970-2000      (0.03)   
         
Diamond Production      0.00   
 per capita, 1970-2000      (0.04)   
         
Executive Constraints in        -0.02  
 Independence Year       (0.06)  
         
Mean Executive Constraints,        0.09 
 1961-2013        (0.07) 
         
Constant 0.45 0.32 0.75 0.37 0.38 0.43 0.40 0.19 
 (0.63) (0.42) (0.94) (0.43) (0.62) (0.51) (0.65) (0.46) 
Observations 35 32 32 30 34 35 35 35 
R2, second stage 0.31 0.33 0.33 0.23 0.33 0.30 0.30 0.33 
adj. R2, second stage 0.27 0.28 0.29 0.17 0.28 0.20 0.25 0.29 
F statistic, first stage 6.51 10.26 11.53 9.90 10.50 17.23 12.19 8.82 
Wooldridge’s heteroskedasticity-robust .313 .267 .253 .234 .131 .871 .421 .093 
 score test (p-value in brackets) (0.576) (0.605) (0.615) (0.628) (0.717) (0.351) (0.517) (0.760) 
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, *at the 10% level. The variables Slave Exports, Years of  
Ancient State History, Fractal Dimension, Gold Production, Oil Production and Diamond Production are log transformed. The instrument for precolonial centralization is the 
“national” TseTse Suitability Index (TSI) which is constructed by the authors. 
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Dependent Variable: 
Bureaucratic Quality, 2014 
2SLS 
(9) 
2SLS 
(10) 
2SLS 
(11) 
2SLS 
(12) 
2SLS 
(13) 
2SLS 
(14) 
2SLS 
(15) 
2SLS 
(16) 
         
Precolonial Centralization 1.79*** 1.15 0.87 1.60*** 1.86** 1.61*** 1.65*** 1.79*** 
 (0.62) (0.94) (0.73) (0.61) (0.94) (0.60) (0.62) (0.56) 
         
Years of Independence -0.00*        
 (0.00)        
         
Gross public revenue  -0.49       
 per capita, 1925  (0.40)       
         
Mean GDP per capita, 1970s   -0.22      
 (constant 2005 USD)   (0.38)      
         
Mean GDP per capita, 1980s   -0.59      
 (constant 2005 USD)   (0.65)      
         
Mean GDP per capita, 1990s   0.31      
 (constant 2005 USD)   (0.42)      
         
Mean GDP per capita, 2000s   0.56      
 (constant 2005 USD)   (0.41)      
         
Communist Legacy    -0.35**     
    (0.17)     
         
European Descent in 1900     -0.06    
     (0.06)    
         
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization      -0.05   
      (0.38)   
         
Polarization Index       0.13  
       (0.68)  
         
Catholic        0.00 
        (0.01) 
         
Protestant        0.01 
        (0.01) 
         
Muslim        0.00 
        (0.01) 
         
Constant 0.43 0.84 0.42 0.42 0.32 0.37 0.27 0.05 
 (0.46) (0.52) (0.73) (0.42) (0.53) (0.55) (0.40) (0.39) 
Observations 35 20 32 35 33 32 32 35 
R2, second stage 0.29 0.24 0.47 0.33 0.24 0.34 0.30 0.30 
adj. R2, second stage 0.25 0.15 0.37 0.29 0.19 0.29 0.25 0.21 
F statistic, first stage 14.38 8.58 6.66 16.62 7.76 14.52 13.69 9.70 
Wooldridge’s heteroskedasticity-robust .556 0.009 .003 .186 .303 .116 .262 .763 
 score test (p-value in brackets) (0.456) (0.923) (0.954) (0.666) (0.582) (0.733) (0.609) (0.382) 
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, *at the 10% level. The variable GDP per capita is log transformed. The instrument for 
precolonial centralization is the “national” TseTse Suitability Index (TSI) which is constructed by the authors. 
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Table A3.12: Precolonial Centralization and Average State Capacity 1996-2014, additional controls, 2SLS estimates 
Dependent Variable: 
Mean Bureaucratic Quality, 1996-2014 
2SLS 
(1) 
2SLS 
(2) 
2SLS 
(3) 
2SLS 
(4) 
2SLS 
(5) 
2SLS 
(6) 
2SLS 
(7) 
2SLS 
(8) 
         
Precolonial centralization 1.43* 1.39* 1.86*** 1.86*** 1.54** 1.63** 1.68** 1.40** 
 (0.77) (0.72) (0.66) (0.66) (0.75) (0.70) (0.71) (0.62) 
         
Slave Exports (area) -0.04        
 (0.04)        
         
Slave Exports (population)  -0.05       
  (0.04)       
         
State Antiquity   -0.50      
   (0.49)      
         
Years of Ancient State History    -0.18     
     (0.18)     
         
Vertical Legitimacy     -0.13    
     (0.37)    
         
Fractal Dimension      3.93   
      (9.40)   
         
Executive Constraints in        -0.01  
 Independence Year       (0.06)  
         
Mean Executive Constraints,        0.09 
 1961-1996        (0.06) 
         
Constant 0.61 1.00 0.36 1.18 0.39 0.25 0.33 0.23 
 (0.62) (0.75) (0.43) (0.92) (0.43) (0.65) (0.64) (0.42) 
Observations 35 35 32 32 30 34 35 35 
R2, second stage 0.31 0.32 0.26 0.28 0.20 0.29 0.25 0.30 
adj. R2, second stage 0.26 0.28 0.21 0.23 0.14 0.25 0.20 0.26 
F-statistic, first stage 6.51 7.10 10.26 11.35 9.90 10.50 12.19 8.02 
Wooldridge’s heteroskedasticity-robust .408 .423 .669 .579 .261 .268 .621 .236 
 score test (p-value in brackets) (0.523) (0.516) (0.414) (0.447) (0.609) (0.605) (0.431) (0.627) 
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, *at the 10% level. The variables Slave Exports, Years of Ancient State History, 
and Fractal Dimension are log transformed. The instrument for precolonial centralization is the “national” TseTse Suitability Index (TSI) which is constructed by the authors. 
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Dependent Variable: 
Mean Bureaucratic Quality, 1996-2014 
2SLS 
(9) 
2SLS 
(10) 
2SLS 
(11) 
2SLS 
(12) 
2SLS 
(13) 
2SLS 
(14) 
2SLS 
(15) 
2SLS 
(16) 
         
Precolonial Centralization 1.76*** 0.70 1.51*** 1.51** 2.06* 1.55** 1.59** 1.77*** 
 (0.63) (0.84) (0.58) (0.60) (1.18) (0.62) (0.63) (0.54) 
         
Years of Independence -0.00**        
 (0.00)        
         
Gross public revenue  -0.39       
 per capita, 1925  (0.41)       
         
Mean GDP per capita, 1970s   -0.62**      
 (constant 2005 USD)   (0.30)      
         
Mean GDP per capita, 1980s   0.61**      
 (constant 2005 USD)   (0.30)      
         
Communist Legacy    -0.46***     
    (0.17)     
         
European Descent in 1900     -0.03    
     (0.04)    
         
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization      -0.04   
      (0.40)   
         
Polarization Index       -0.07  
       (0.66)  
         
Catholic        0.00 
        (0.01) 
         
Protestant        0.01 
        (0.01) 
         
Muslim        0.00 
        (0.01) 
         
Constant 0.40 1.00** 0.45 0.46 0.14 0.38 0.39 0.12 
 (0.46) (0.47) (0.86) (0.41) (0.65) (0.59) (0.41) (0.37) 
Observations 35 20 32 35 35 32 32 35 
R2 0.25 0.16 0.36 0.32 0.17 0.31 0.29 0.26 
adj. R2 0.20 0.07 0.29 0.28 0.12 0.26 0.24 0.16 
F-statistic, first stage 14.38 8.58 12.07 16.63 5.04 14.51 13.69 9.70 
Wooldridge’s heteroskedasticity-robust .804 .060 .424 .265 .641 .221 .321 1.186 
 score test (p-value in brackets) (0.370) (0.807) (0.515) (0.606) (0.423) (0.638) (0.571) (0.276) 
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, *at the 10% level. The variable GDP per capita is log transformed. 
The instrument for precolonial centralization is the “national” TseTse Suitability Index (TSI) which is constructed by the authors. 
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APPENDIX 4: LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure A4.1: Scatterplots visualizing the relationship between precolonial centralization and state capacity 
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Figure A4.2: Scatterplots visualizing the relationship between precolonial centralization and aid dependence 
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